REPORTABLE
(76)
Judgment
No S.C.79\2002
Crim.
Appeal No 209\99
MASAMBA
CHININGA v THE STATE
SUPREME
COURT OF ZIMBABWE
CHIDYAUSIKU
CJ, ZIYAMBI JA & MALABA JA
BULAWAYO
MARCH 26 & OCTOBER 30, 2002
S.
Siziba,
for the appellant
T.
Mujaji,
for the respondent
CHIDYAUSIKU
CJ: The appellant in this case was charged with the crime of
murder. He pleaded not guilty but was found guilty
of murder with
actual intent. The court found no extenuating circumstances and
imposed the death sentence. The appellant now
appeals to this court
against both the conviction and sentence.
In
convicting the appellant the trial court found the following facts to
have been proved. That on the day the appellant killed
the deceased
he and other patrons were having a drink at Pumula East Bottle Store.
The deceased, Fortunate Ncube, also called at
this bottle store for
a drink. When the deceased arrived at the bottle store, his height
caused a stir among the patrons and several
comments were made about
his height. It was observed that when he walked into the bottle
store he had to bend even where other
people do not bend. The
deceased, who was very tall, pointed out to the people in the bottle
store that he felt harassed by those
people who were making comments
about his height.
The trial
court accepted the evidence of Mr Jele, the manager of the bottle
store, to the effect that he had observed the deceased
enter and
leave the bottle store. He also saw the appellant, through the big
windows, approaching the deceased and stabbing him.
He further saw
people gather around the deceased. After the stabbing he observed
the appellant take to his heels and run away
outpacing all the people
who were there. It was also the bottle store managers evidence
that there was no quarrel between the
deceased and the appellant.
The court a
quo
was impressed by this witness and accepted his evidence. The
acceptance of Jeles evidence by the court a
quo
cannot be faulted.
The court
also accepted the evidence of Mr Duvai, who appears to be a friend of
the deceased, and was with him at the bottle store.
His evidence
corroborated that of Jele in many respects. He stated that, of all
the people who were mocking the deceased, the
appellant was the most
vocal. He advised the deceased to ignore the provocation which
advice was followed by the deceased except
for the occasion when he
wished to go for the appellant but was dissuaded from doing so. The
appellant was heard to say that although
the deceased was tall, he,
the appellant, could bring the deceased down. The deceased
responded by querying how would such a short
person fell him.
The appellant
was thereafter observed approaching the deceased pointing a finger at
him and pulling a knife from his pocket with the
other hand. Having
pulled out the knife, the appellant stabbed the deceased three times
before running away.
The injuries
sustained by the deceased as a result of this attack are contained in
the post-mortem report.
The appellant
raised the defences of provocation and drunkenness. Both defences
were rejected by the court a
quo.
Indeed, although there was no formal abandonment of the appeal
against conviction, Mr Siziba,
for the appellant, conceded that he had no useful submissions to make
in respect of conviction. He made submissions only in respect
of
the finding that no extenuating circumstances exist in this case.
This attitude by the appellants counsel is perfectly
understandable
given the facts of this case and, in particular, given
the nature of the injuries inflicted on the deceased and the weapon
used
- an Okapi knife which was relatively long and sharp. The
deceased died instantly.
The
post-mortem report reveals the following injuries on the deceased:-
EXTERNAL
EXAMINATION Nutrition -
Good
Marks of violence:-
Three
stab wounds are present: one on the left chest and two on the left
shoulder. The chest stab wound is 4 cm long, 1.5cm wide
and 7cm
deep. It is located 4cm from the midline and 4cm below the left
clavicle. The shoulder stab wounds are measuring 6cm
long, 2cm
wide and 10cm deep for the wound on the lateral aspect and 3cm long,
1,5cm wide and 7cm deep for the wound on the posterior
aspect of the
shoulder.
According
to the report death was due to haemorrhagic shock following multiple
stab wounds. On these facts a conviction of murder
with actual
intent is the correct verdict. Accordingly the appeal against
conviction cannot succeed.
I now turn to
deal with the issue of the sentence. The court a
quo
found no extenuating circumstances to exist and imposed the death
sentence. In the court a
quo
the appellant advanced two grounds of extenuation, namely,
drunkenness and youthfulness. A reading of the judgment of the
court
a
quo
clearly reveals that the court considered these grounds separately
and concluded that there were no extenuating circumstances.
The
court did not consider the cumulative effect of the two extenuating
factors. This is where the court erred. A trial court
should
consider the cumulative effect of possible extenuating circumstances.
Where an accused person relies on a number of factors
for
extenuation a trial court misdirects itself if it considers and
dismisses each factor in isolation. The trial court must consider
the cumulative effect of the extenuating circumstances pleaded.
This proposition is well supported by a line of cases starting
with
the case of S
v Manyathi
1967 (1) SA 435 (A). In that case WILLIAMSON JA had this to say at
p 439D-F:-
To
decide properly whether an accuseds mental state at the time he
committed a crime was such that his conduct was less blameworthy
than
it might normally be obviously requires a consideration of the
cumulative effect of all the relevant circumstances. A failure
by a
Court to address its mind to the possible cumulative effect of all
the relevant factors which might constitute extenuating circumstances
in a case such as the present would amount to the Court misdirecting
itself on the question in issue.
Manyathis
case, supra,
was considered and followed in the case of
S v Sigwahla 1967 (4)
SA 556 (A).
I am
therefore satisfied that the court a
quo
misdirected itself in its approach to the issue of the existence or
otherwise of extenuating circumstances. Because of the trial
courts misdirection this Court is at large to determine that
issue. See S
v Babada
1964 (1) SA 702 at p 705; S
v Bowers
1971 (4) SA 646 (A); S
v Felix and Another
1980 (4) SA 604 (A).
I will now
proceed to determine the issue of extenuating circumstances. It is
common cause that the appellant had taken alcohol
before stabbing the
deceased. What is at issue is how much he had taken and what
effect, if any, it had on him at the time he stabbed
the deceased.
The evidence of the appellant was that he had started drinking at ten
oclock in the morning, and more or less
continued doing so until
the fight with the deceased during which he stabbed him to death.
According to his evidence he had consumed
about nine scuds from about
10 oclock in the morning to 2 pm. It would appear that a scud
contains about two litres of opaque
beer. On this basis the
appellant, in effect, was contending that he had consumed 18 litres
of opaque beer prior to this incident.
It is also common cause that
after the appellant stabbed the deceased he took to his heels and
outpaced everyone and could not
be arrested there and then. It was
put to the appellant that if he was that drunk he could not have run
that fast. The following
exchange between the appellant and State
counsel is instructive:-
Q. After you had stabbed the
deceased you were able to run away from the people who wanted to
apprehend you.
Yes,
because I got frightened, in panic I ran away when I realised what I
had done.
So
regardless of the fact that you had been taking alcohol, you were
able to outrun all the people who were at the bottle store?
Yes,
once I realized what I had done I sobered up.
I put it to
you that you had not taken as much alcohol as you would want this
court to believe and that is why you were able to
outrun everyone
who was there and to sober up in a short space of time as you are
saying you had then sobered up.
No,
I had taken a lot of beer.
The court a
quo
also rejected the appellants evidence on the amount of alcohol he
had taken. In this regard the learned judge remarked as follows:-
We
are unable to believe this kind of evidence. If you had consumed so
much beer in fact, you would be in a deep sleep or in a coma
and what
happened in
this case would not have happened at all. It would just not be
possible for you to be moving around, standing there with your
friends and threatening the deceased as you did.
Even
if you had taken some alcohol, it is clear you knew what you were
doing. Once you saw what happened you were able to run away,
outpacing all the people there including possibly some people who
were sober and not drunk at all.
We
do not believe that you would be able to pull yourself at such a high
speed with almost twenty litres in your stomach to outpace
other
people who were not drunk.
The above
remarks were made when the learned judge was considering the verdict
and the defence of drunkenness.
The
following is what the learned judge said when he considered alcohol
as an extenuating factor:-
We
have considered the submission regarding the consumption of alcohol
by yourself. We nevertheless find that we are not moved from
the
finding that you had not consumed as much alcohol as you allege.
Even if you may have consumed alcohol, there is nothing to
suggest
that you had consumed so much to the extent that your conduct was
influenced by it because the evidence is to the effect
that you just
arrived at the bottle store and purchased what you were drinking at
the time.
From the
above excerpts it would appear that both the State and the court a
quo
were satisfied that the appellant had consumed some alcohol prior to
the fatal stabbing of the deceased. The court a
quo, having
determined that the appellant knew what he was doing, left open the
issue of how much alcohol the appellant had taken and what
effect, if
any, it had on him. Given the above evidence I have no doubt that
alcohol had some influence on the appellants unlawful
conduct.
The reason for the fight between the deceased and the appellant was
trivial. The appellant persistently jeered at the
deceased because
of his height. This incident occurred at a bottle store where both
parties were drinking in the company of friends.
The most probable
inference to be drawn from the above facts, in my view, is that the
appellant, perhaps not as drunk as he would
want the Court to
believe, was under the influence of alcohol to some extent. It is
not possible to determine on the evidence before
the Court the degree
of such intoxication.
On this
basis I am satisfied that the appellant, at the time he stabbed the
deceased was under the influence of alcohol although
it is not
possible, on the evidence, to determine the precise degree of
influence. The probabilities are that the influence was
considerable.
The
appellant was aged 21 years at the time he committed the offence.
It is trite that youthfulness is an extenuating feature
or factor.
In terms of s 338(c) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
[Chapter
9:07]
it is not competent for a court to impose a death sentence on an
accused aged 18 years and under. Thus, in the case of an accused
person aged 18 years and under the issue of extenuation does not even
arise as the death sentence is incompetent because of youthfulness.
It is trite
that youthfulness on its own or together with other factors can
constitute an extenuating circumstance. S
v Lehnberg
1975 (4) SA 553 (AD). Youthfulness connotes immaturity, lack of
experience of life, thoughtlessness and a mental condition of
susceptibility
to external influences, especially those emanating
from adult persons. Lehnberg,
supra,
at 561A-C.
In
dealing with the appellants youth the learned judge had this to
say:-
On
youthfulness, again we are advised that you were twenty-one at the
time you committed this crime. We do not accept that because
of
youthfulness at twenty-one you can be excused from the serious crime
that you committed just because you are still a young person.
Young
persons cannot and should never be allowed to go about committing
serious crimes and hiding behind youthfulness. The law
of the land
is very clear on situations like this. Where you kill and there are
no extenuating circumstances, the legal consequences
have to follow.
We
have examined the situation in this case and we come to the
conclusion that there are no extenuating circumstances.
When a court
concludes that extenuating circumstances exist in a case it is not in
any way condoning or justifying the commission
of the most heinous of
offences, namely, murder. It merely means that the court is being
perceptive of human frailties and balancing
them against the evil
deed. See S
v Sigwala
1967 (4) SA 566 (AD) at 571.
The conduct
of the appellant in this case, in my view, evinces a very high degree
of thoughtlessness and immaturity that can only
be explained by his
youthfulness and the fact that he had consumed some alcohol.
I am
satisfied that in this case the cumulative effect of the appellants
youth and the influence of the alcohol he had consumed
justifies the
imposition of a sentence other than a death sentence. I wish,
however, to emphasise the point that if it had not
been for the
misdirection it would not have been possible for this Court to
interfere with the discretion of the court a
quo.
As the court
a
quo
correctly observed this was a very bad case of murder. An innocent
life was lost for no reason. The most severe sentence other
than
the death sentence would be the most appropriate sentence taking into
account all the factors in this case.
In the
result the appeal against conviction is dismissed. The appeal
against sentence succeeds to the extent that the death sentence
is
set aside and substituted with imprisonment for life.
ZIYAMBI
JA: I agree
MALABA
JA: I agree
Pro
Deo