DISTRIBUTABLE
(88)
Judgment
No. SC 98/05
Civil
Appeal No. 306/04
NDUMISO
MDLONGWA v THEMBEKILE MDLONGWA
SUPREME
COURT OF ZIMBABWE
CHEDA
JA, MALABA JA & NDOU AJA
BULAWAYO,
NOVEMBER 28, 2005
J
Sibanda, for the
appellant
N
Moyo, for the
respondent
NDOU AJA: After hearing the
appellants argument in this matter, we dismissed (with costs) the
appeal without hearing the respondents
counsel and indicated that
the reasons would follow. These are the reasons -
The salient facts of the matter
are the following:
The
parties used to be married to each other but divorced on 3 October
2002 on the basis of a consent paper signed by the appellant
on 3
July 2002 and respondent on 4 July 2002. This much is apparent from
the consent paper. Paragraph 4 of the consent paper
(now an order
of the High Court) reads:-
The
defendant (appellant) shall be given first preference if by the 90th
day he has failed to raise plaintiffs half share of $750 000,00
the plaintiff (respondent) shall be allowed to purchase, defendants
share failing which the house shall be sold to best advantage and the
proceeds therefrom shared equally between the parties.
After the signing of the consent
paper, but before the divorce was granted, it became necessary to
initial every paper. The consent
paper comprised some four pages,
and apart from the last page which was signed all the other pages had
not been initialed. The
need for initialing the consent paper arose
after the respondents legal practitioner noted an obvious
difference in the type of
print on the various pages of the consent
paper. The different print was occasioned by the correction of
errors in respect of movable
assets. The corrections were done
before, and not after the parties signatures.
The
fear of the respondents legal practitioner was that a judge
dealing with the divorce might query this, and decline to grant
the
order until the said papers were attended to. The consent paper was
sent back to the appellant to initial on every page which
he did.
Ex-facie,
there is no date showing when the initialing took place. The
appellant said, in the court a
quo, that he initialed
it on 23 July 2002. There is nothing to contradict him on this.
It is common cause that the
appellant failed to exercise the option given to him to buy out the
respondent within ninety days (i.e.
by 3 October 2002), of the date
of the last signature, which is 4 July 2002. The appellants case
is that the reckoning of
the ninety days commences on the date of the
above-mentioned initialing, i.e. 23 July 2002 and not the date of the
last partys
signature. In other words the appellants
submission is that the above initialing of the pages of the consent
paper interrupted
the day of reckoning. The court a
quo, held that signing
of the consent paper was not overridden by the subsequent initialing
of (the unsigned) pages of the consent paper.
This finding cannot
be faulted. First, the consent paper in paragraph 4 supra,
clearly states within three months of the date
of signature on this paper
(emphasis added). The last party was signed on 4 July 2002.
There is no other date thereafter of the signature. The
appellant's alleged date of 23 July 2002, even if it is correct, is
not on the consent paper. On this point alone the appeal should
fail.
The object of initialing is to
remove any suspicion that may be created by the use of different
print as alluded to above. The
difference was occasioned by the
need to correct genuine errors in respect of the allocation of the
movable property. This correction
took place before the consent
paper became an order of the court.
Further,
the signing of the consent paper in the form outlined above, by the
appellant as being a party to it, created a presumption
that he is
acquainted with its contents. In terms of the caveat subscriptor
rule he is taken to be bound by the ordinary meaning
and effect of
the words which appear over his signature, for the other party is
entitled to assume that he has signified his assent
to the contents
of the document.
Willes Principles of South
African Law (8th
Edition) D Hutchinson
at p 426; Glenburn
Hotels (Pvt) Limited v England
1972 (2) SA 660 (RAD), Dutoit
v Atkinsonis Motors BPK
1985(2) SA 893 A and The
Principles of the Law of Contract, AJ Kerr 4th
edition at 86-90. Even without the initialing the signatures of the
parties would have sufficed because where a signature appears
at the
foot of the written document, it is to be taken conclusively to apply
to the whole document unless something is expressed
to rebut that
presumption Chitty
on Contracts: General Principles
22nd
edition at paragraph 169.
Finally
the appellant knew very well that the day of reckoning started on the
day they signed the consent paper and not on the day
of the
initialing, hence his legal practitioners letter wherein he
stated:
As
explained to you, the writer has no knowledge, without
the consent paper, of
knowing whether the period that the parties agreed on for our client
to raise funds expired (emphasis added).
The
appellant was desirous to see the consent paper in order to start
reckoning the dates. Surely, the last date he would find in
the
consent paper is 4 July 2004. The later date of 23 July 2002, which
he introduced by evidence, does not appear on the consent
paper at
all.
The appeal, is therefore, without
merit.
CHEDA
JA: I agree.
MALABA
JA: I agree.
Job Sibanda & Associates,
appellant's legal practitioners
Moyo
& Partners,
respondent's legal practitioners