REPORTABLE
ZLR (36)
Judgment No. SC. 36/06
Civil
Appeal No. 312/05
CHEVRON
INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED v (1) SHUPIKAI
CHIHURI (2) THE REGISTRAR OF
DEEDS N.O.
SUPREME
COURT OF ZIMBABWE
SANDURA
JA, ZIYAMBI JA, & GWAUNZA JA
HARARE,
MAY 9 & SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
A
Moyo, for the
appellant
T
Mangena, for the first
respondent
No
appearance for the second respondent
GWAUNZA
JA: This is an appeal against a judgment of the High Court, in terms
of which the appellant was ordered to sign all papers
necessary to
effect transfer of certain property in Harare, to the respondent.
The court a quo also set aside the purported cancellation,
by the
appellant, of the agreement in terms of which the disputed property
had been sold to the
respondent.
The following background to the
dispute is not disputed-
On
15 February 2005, the respondent responded to a newspaper
advertisement concerning the sale of immovable property at No.48
Tungsgate
Road, Northwood. The property belonged to the appellant
and had been advertised for sale, at the appellants instance,
through
an estate agent. Having decided to buy the property, the
respondent attended on the estate agent and signed an irrevocable
offer
form, offering to buy the property for $765 million. He
offered to pay a deposit of $400 million, with the balance being
payable
upon transfer.
On
16 February 2005 the irrevocable offer form was signed on behalf of
the appellant. Even though in the space provided for this purpose
on
the form, it is indicated that the offer had been accepted for the
appellant by Innocent Muchenje and Mordeline Nedziwe, there
is a
dispute as to whether the latter actually signed the form. It is,
however, not disputed that Innocent Muchenje signed it. I
will
address this dispute later.
The
respondent, on the same day, signed a formal agreement of sale and
paid the deposit of $400 million the following day. A day
later, on
18 February 2005, the appellant wrote to the estate agent,
instructing them to cancel the contract of sale. The opening
paragraph of the letter read as follows:
We
wish to formally put aside our
acceptance of the
offer put forward, of ZW 765 million as the purchase price of the
property
(my emphasis).
The
letter went on to state that a review of the selling price was
necessary given the rate of inflation. The letter was
signed
by the appellants three directors, including Innocent Muchenje,
who had signed the irrevocable offer form two days previously.
In
response to this development, the respondent, through his lawyers,
rejected the withdrawal of the appellants acceptance of his
offer
and insisted on the latter abiding by the contract of sale. The
appellant responded by letter dated 22 February 2005 and advanced
new
grounds for wishing to have the agreement cancelled. These were that
no company resolution had been passed to dispose of the
property in
question; that the respondent had failed to disclose the fact that
his offer to purchase the property was conditional
upon obtaining
mortgage finance; and that, in accepting the offer, the appellant had
acted on incorrect information supplied by
the estate agents in
respect of the Capital Gains Tax payable by it.
The
respondent after this resorted to the application whose determination
is now being appealed against.
In
the court a quo,
the learned Judge correctly determined that the issue to be decided
was whether a valid contract between the parties existed and
if so,
whether the appellant in
casu had a basis for
cancelling such agreement.
Application
to adduce fresh evidence on appeal
As
already indicated, the appellant, in the court a
quo, advanced a number
of reasons for wishing to rescind its earlier acceptance of the
respondents offer.
Now,
on appeal to this Court, the appellant seeks to advance yet another
ground for revoking the sale, and has for that purpose filed
an
application, which is opposed by the respondent, to adduce fresh
evidence.
I
will deal with this application first before considering the merits
of the appeal.
The
fresh evidence that the appellant seeks to adduce on appeal is in the
form of a report from the Registrar of Deeds, to the effect
that the
property in dispute is the only immovable property registered in the
name of the appellant. The appellant relies on this
report to
contend that the property in question forms the sole asset of the
appellant. In paragraph 4 of its founding affidavit,
the appellant
submits that the court a
quo had proceeded on
the assumption that it (appellant) had no property, movable or
otherwise, outside of the disputed property. Later
in the same
affidavit, (paragraph 7), the appellant seemingly contradicts itself
by stating that the allegation to the effect that
the house in
question constituted the sole asset of the appellant, was not made in
the court a quo.
The appellant does not explain how the court a
quo could have
proceeded on that assumption if the matter was not specifically
alleged, and if, as the appellant itself concedes, it
was not an
issue then. In any event, there is no indication in the judgment of
the court a quo
that the implications of the appellant owning that or any other asset
had exercised the learned Judges mind, much less that she
had
proceeded on the assumption that the appellant owned only one asset.
Simply, the matter was not placed before her as evidence,
and
therefore was not considered at all.
Counsel
for the appellant, Mr
Moyo, submits that it
was an oversight on the part of the appellants then legal
practitioner in the court a
quo, not to tender the
evidence now being sought to be adduced. He also concedes that the
evidence concerned was available at the time
the matter was heard a
quo and could have
been obtained, except that no effort had been made to do so. From
this, it can in my view be safely assumed, and I
so find, that the
evidence could have been obtained without any due diligence at all.
I
however, find Mr Moyos
submissions to be quite instructive, in that they suggest clearly
what the motivation was for the application to adduce fresh evidence
on appeal. It was, evidently, the wish to present the appellants
case differently from the manner it was presented in the court
a
quo by a different
legal practitioner. The intention, in the light of the new arguments
now being advanced for the appellant, is to lay
the ground for the
contention that an order upholding the agreement of sale would result
in a contravention of Sec 183 of the Companies
Act, (Chapter 24:03)
(the Act)
As
both counsel indicate in their heads of argument, the law, and the
authorities, are quite clear on what constitutes good grounds
for the
adducing of fresh evidence on appeal.
The grounds do not include the need to argue the dispute on the basis
of new facts not prsented in the court a
quo. To the contrary
the law expressly frowns upon such attempts as is succinctly stated
by McNALLY JA in Kearns
v Waltes Enterprises
S160/90
In
the circumstances we do not wish to set a precedent for litigants to
treat the Supreme Court as a second court of first instance,
a court
in which they can try out the issues again on fresh facts if the
first set proved to be inadequate.
These
words can aptly be applied to the circumstances of this case. By
asserting that the appellants counsel in the court a
quo, through an
oversight, failed to adduce the evidence now being sought to be
introduced, the appellant is clearly stating that the
evidence it
presented in support of its case in the court a
quo was inadequate.
Hence its desire to complete or supplement that evidence by adducing
additional evidence on appeal. Apart from
giving the appellant
another chance to argue its case differently, granting the
application would result in unduly delaying finalisation
of the
matter. As WESSELS CJ correctly stated in Colman
v Dunbar 1933 AD 141
at 161:
It
is essential that there should be finality to a trial, and therefore
if a suitor elects to stand by the evidence which he adduces,
he
should not be allowed to adduce further evidence except in
exceptional circumstances.
In
casu,
the appellant has not shown that there are special circumstances to
warrant a departure from the general rule. The evidence was
available and could have been easily accessed. No effort was made to
obtain the evidence because it did not occur to the appellants
counsel that it was relevant to the dispute, and it is being brought
up now simply because another legal practitioner considers it
to be
relevant after all. In addition to this, I am not persuaded, as
indicated below, that the evidence in question would have had
an
important influence on the result of the case.
In
view of the foregoing, I find that the applicant has failed to prove
a case for adducing fresh evidence on appeal.
The
application is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Merits
I
will turn now to the merits of the appeal, and note from the outset
that the appellant has abandoned its first ground of appeal
and now
relies on the remaining two grounds, which are, that the honourable
court erred by;
(i) finding that one of the
directors had ostensible authority to sell the property in question;
and
(ii) finding that two directors
signed the irrevocable offer form.
The
argument concerning the lack of authority that the appellant now
alleges in respect of its director, Innocent Muchenje, has
been
expanded upon on appeal. The appellant now argues that the authority
in question could only have been that referred to in s
183 of the
Act.
Section 183 of the Act provides
as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding anything
in the articles, the directors of a company shall not be empowered,
without the approval of the company
in general meeting
(a)
(b) to dispose of the undertaking
of the company or of the whole or the greater part of the assets of
the company.
(2) No resolution of the company
shall be effective as approving
of a disposal in terms of
paragraph of subsection (1) unless
it authorizes, in terms, the
specific transaction proposed by the directors.
The
appellant contends that s 183 of the Act renders unenforceable any
agreement entered into for and on its behalf by one of its
directors
to dispose of the companys undertaking or the whole or greater
part of its assets, without the sanction of the shareholders
as
provided for in that section. The appellant advances this argument
even though, by its own admission, it led no evidence in the
court a
quo specifically
relating to the applicability or otherwise, of s 183 of the Act, nor
the extent of the appellants assets. Despite
what counsel for
the appellant, Mr Moyo,
now wishes to advance as one of the appellants grounds of appeal,
it is very clear from a reading of the evidence presented in
the
court a quo
that the appellants reference to authority had nothing to do
with the provisions of s 183 of the Act. This in reality explains
why
the learned trial judge made no reference to s 183 and determined the
matter on the basis of ostensible authority, which she
was satisfied
the respondent properly relied on in seeking to hold the appellant to
its acceptance of his offer. The learned Judge
a
quo, in my view
correctly analysed the evidence as follows:
The
letter of 18 February 2005 purporting to withdraw the acceptance of
the offer was signed by all three of the company directors.
In that
letter the three directors acknowledge that they were aware that
the property was on sale, that a party had offered
to buy the
property at $765 million and that they had accepted the offer but
they now wish to resile from the contract. They do
not raise the
issue of lack of authority. The applicant was entitled to
have assumed that the directors, who signed the acceptance
form,
must have authority in one form or another to bind the company and
that all acts of internal management or organisation
on which
the exercise of such authority is dependent may, in terms of the
Turquands
rule be assumed by a bona
fide third party to
have been properly and duly performed.
Except
for her reference to directors having signed the irrevocable
offer form, I find the reasoning and decision of the learned
Judge a
quo, based as it was
on the evidence that was presented before her, to be correct. In any
case, it is irrelevant in this respect, whether
one or two directors
signed the acceptance form. The appellant therefore cannot, as it now
seeks to do, be heard to argue that the
court a
quo erred by ordering
specific performance when to do so would contravene s 183 of the Act.
Nor is there any basis for the appellant
to argue that the court a
quo erred in finding
that the Turquand
rule prevailed over s 183 of the companies Act. The onus
was on the appellant in the court a
quo to draw the
learned Judges attention to s 183 and its possible effect on the
transaction complained of. The appellant did not
do so, and the
Judge proceeded to determine the matter on the basis of the evidence
that was placed before her.
As a general rule, an applicants case falls or stands on the
evidence that he or she places before the court. While the court
might, mero motu,
properly go outside of this evidence to consider other legal aspects
pertinent to the dispute before it, it is not in every case
that the
failure by the court to do so amounts to a misdirection at law.
I
am satisfied, when all is told, that the court a quo properly
determined the matter on the basis of ostensible authority.
Consequently,
I find there is no merit in the appellants first
ground of appeal.
Having
said this however, I am mindful of the fact that one may raise a
point of law at any stage of the proceedings in dispute before
the
court, including the appeal stage. The applicability or otherwise of
s 183 of the Companies Act is a point of law. It is on
this basis,
and in order to put the matter beyond any doubt, that I will consider
the merits or demerits of the appellants argument
that the order
of specific performance granted by the court a
quo would offend
against the provisions of s 183 of the Companies Act.
Section
183 of the Companies Act, from a closer reading thereof, is
contravened when the directors of a company go behind the back
of its
shareholders and dispose of the undertaking of the company or of the
whole or the greater part of its assets. Where the directors,
in so
doing, purport to act on the basis of a company resolution, their
actions shall be null
and void
unless the resolution in question, in terms, specifically
authorises the transaction.
In
the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the directors of the
appellant who, according to the evidence before the court, were
three
in number, commissioned an estate agent to advertise for sale, and
sell, on their behalf, the property in question. After
the
respondent offered to buy the property on certain payment terms, the
offer was accepted in writing on behalf of the appellant.
Even
though the appellant now disputes that the irrevocable offer form was
signed on its behalf by two of its directors, what is
relevant and
significant is that at some point not specifically indicated, but to
be inferred from paragraph one of their letter
of 18 February 2005,
all the three directors of the appellant ratified and confirmed the
acceptance.
The
effect of this ratification in the light of s 183 of the Act is that
all three directors of the appellant purported to dispose
of an asset
of the company. What has not been established, because that
information was not placed before the court a
quo nor was
the point argued, was
what percentage of the total assets of the appellant was represented
by the immovable property in question.
The argument, which, in my
view is valid, is made on behalf of the respondent that without an
indication of the extent of the appellants
assets, it is not
possible for the court to ascertain, for purposes of s 183 of the
Act, whether the property constituted the whole
or a greater part of
the assets of the company.
I
interpret para 1(b) of s 183 to mean that the directors of a company
can properly dispose of minor assets of the company without
the
authority of the shareholders. Therefore, in order to establish that
the asset in question constitutes a quantity the disposal
of which
would contravene the section, it is, in my view, necessary to place
before the court evidence concerning the full extent
of the companys
assets. This the appellant has not done. The fact that the appellant
already owned one immovable asset did not
of itself mean it did not
own other assets, both movable and immovable. As long as it has not
been, and cannot on the papers be,
established that the property in
question constitutes a percentage of the assets that sub paragraph
183 1 (b) provides should not
be disposed without authorisation, s
183(1)(b) will not apply. If that paragraph does not apply, it
follows that subs 183(2), which
provides for specific authorisation
of the transaction in question, does not apply. The authorisation
relates only to the quantity
of assets specified in subs 1. It is
evident therefore that the order for specific performance, that the
court a
quo made, would not
have offended against S 183 (1)(b) of the Companies Act.
However,
even had the appellant placed before the court, evidence to show that
the property in question was the whole or a major
part of its assets,
I am not persuaded it would have succeeded in its attempts to resile
from the agreement of sale. I am in this
respect persuaded by the
respondents contention that the doctrine of unanimous assent would
have been successfully invoked against
the appellant. It is not
disputed that, while calling themselves directors, the three
signatories to the letter of 18 February 2005
were also the only
shareholders of the appellant. Indeed Mr Moyo for the appellant was
not able to submit that there were other shareholders
of the
appellant besides the three. In their joint capacities as directors
and shareholders, the three commissioned the estate agent
concerned
to sell the property in question, on their behalf.
It
has been submitted, and not disputed, that all the three
directors/shareholders were present during the viewing of the
property
by prospective buyers who included the respondent. After
the latter made an offer for the property and one of the directors
accepted
it in writing, the rest of the directors, as I have found,
ratified his actions, thereby and effectively giving their authority
in
retrospect. I am indebted to counsel for the respondent, who has
cited in his heads of argument, authorities for the proposition
that
a provision like s 183 would not make any transaction entered into
without the approval of a company in a meeting, null
and void,
so long as it was capable of ratification by the shareholders.
Further, that there was nothing in the Companies Act to prohibit
the authority required for purposes of the provision being
given
retrospectively.
The
situation in which the only directors of a company have disposed of
the major assets of the company without the resolution referred
to in
the Companies Act, was dealt with in Sugden
v Beaconhurst Diaries
(Pvt) Ltd and Ors 1963
(2) SA 174. The principle of mutual assent was described as follows:
In my view, where the only two
shareholders and directors express whether at the same time or
not their joint approval of
a transaction contemplated by s 70
sec (2) [equivalent of our s 183(1)(b)] their decision is as valid
and effectual as if it had
been taken at an effective general meeting
convened all the formalities prescribed by the Act.
Applying
these words to the circumstances of the case at hand, it cannot be
disputed that all the three directors/shareholders approved
the sale
of the property in question, albeit at different times. They later
sought to rescind such approval. On the basis of the
authorities
cited, they clearly cannot do so. Their approval has the same effect
as compliance with s 183(2).
The
respondent, I find, is correct in his submission that the purpose of
s 183 of the Act is to protect the shareholders of a company
against
unscrupulous directors who might wish to dispose of its assets at
will, and to the shareholders detriment. Its purpose
is not to
provide the directors of a company with the means to resile from an
agreement they would have validly entered into with
an innocent
party, when they realise that they may have made a bad bargain.
Therefore,
even if the property in question constituted the sole asset of the
appellant as envisaged in s 183 of the Act, the appellant
would still
not have been able to avoid the consequences of having
retrospectively approved the sale of the property to the respondent.
The
signature(s) on the offer form
I
will now consider the appellants second ground of appeal, which
concerns the signature affixed on its behalf, to the irrevocable
offer form. The appellant charges that the court a
quo erred by finding
that two of its directors signed the irrevocable offer form.
A
perusal of the irrevocable offer form shows there is one space for
the signature of the seller. That space is clearly filled in
by Dr
Innocent Muchenjes signature. The relevant portion of the offer
form reads as follows: The
above offer is hereby accepted by me
and leaves space for the details of the seller to be filled in. Into
this space it is indicated that the offer was accepted by Dr
I
Muchenje and Mordeline Nedziwe on behalf of the appellant. Despite
the reference to Mordeline Nedziwe it is evident that she did
not
sign the offer form, as the only other signature was affixed to the
space marked witness. A comparison of this signature
with that
of Mordeline Ndeziwe, as it appears in the directors letter of 18
February 2005, makes it clear that the signature is
not hers. To put
the matter beyond doubt, the signature does not resemble that of the
other director of the appellant, Mr I Muchenje,
again as it appears
at the end of the letter of 18 February 2005.
Even
if Mordeline Ndeziwe, who was apparently Dr Muchenjes spouse, was
in the company of the former when he signed the offer form
at the
offices of the estate agents, and despite her name being printed on
the form, it is evident that she herself did not sign
the form.
Therefore, for what it is worth, I find there is merit in the
appellants ground of appeal alleging misdirection on
the part of
the court a quo,
when it found that two directors of the appellant had signed the
irrevocable offer form.
This
finding however, is not of much help to the appellant. It is in my
view, irrelevant whether one or two directors signed the
offer form.
What is relevant and crucial is the fact that even by their own
admission, the other two directors ratified the actions
of Dr
Innocent Muchenje.
Taking
all of the foregoing into account, I am satisfied there is no merit
in the appeal.
It is in the result ordered as
follows;
The
appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.
SANDURA
JA: I agree.
ZIYAMBI JA: I agree.
Kantor
& Immerman,
appellant's legal practitioners
Wintertons,
first respondent's legal practitioners