REPORTABLE (5)
Judgment No
SC 5/06
Civil Appeal No 362/99
THANDO
MOYO v (1) MALCOLM FRASER (2) MESSRS COGHLAN
AND WELSH
SUPREME COURT OF
ZIMBABWE
CHIDYAUSIKU CJ,
ZIYAMBI JA & GWAUNZA JA
BULAWAYO NOVEMBER 29,
2004 & March 9, 2006
The appellant in person
P. Dube, for the
first respondent
N. Mathonsi, for
the second respondent
CHIDYAUSIKU CJ: There is only one legal point involved in this
appeal. It is whether the purchaser of land on instalments
who has
not registered the agreement of sale in terms of s 64 of the Deeds
Registries Act [Chapter 20:05] can interdict the trustee
of an
insolvent estate from selling such land to a third party.
The facts of this
matter are set out in some detail by the court a quo in
Judgment Number HC-1065-99. Repeating them in this judgment will
not serve any useful purpose I will only set out the salient
facts
which are as follows.
Mr J.M. Ngwenya
(Ngwenya) was the registered owner of a certain property I
shall refer to hereinafter as Lot 4. Lot
4 was a sub-division
of a larger portion of land owned by Ngwenya. The purchase price
was $25 000 payable in instalments. The
purchase price was paid in
full to Ngwenya. The purchase price was paid by way of instalments.
It is not disputed
that this was a sale of land on instalments. Ngwenyas estate was
placed under sequestration by an order
of the High Court sitting in
Bulawayo and Malcolm Fraser, the first respondent was appointed the
liquidator and trustee. I shall
refer to him as the trustee.
The trustee then sold property belonging to the insolvent estate of
Ngwenya including Lot 4
to various purchasers.
It is contended by
the appellant and not disputed by the respondents that Lot 4 was only
one of a number of sub-divisions sold by
Ngwenya to various
individuals before he became insolvent. The trustee, for reasons
which are not clear from the record, sold the
sub-divisions to the
same purchasers but denied the appellant the same opportunity to buy
Lot 4. The trustee instead sold Lot 4
to a third party. It is
apparent, however, from the record that the appellant at one time
received $7 000 without prejudice as
his pro rata claim
against the insolvents estate in respect of monies he had paid as
the purchase price of Lot 4. It is also apparent
from the record
that the appellant offered to pay for Lot 4 in an amount in excess of
the purchase price agreed to by the third party.
This offer was
turned down. From a legal point of view the trustee could not
accept this offer if he had already sold Lot 4 to
a third party.
The appellant was aggrieved by this turn of events. The trustee
instructed the second respondent to effect transfer
of Lot 4 to the
third party.
The appellant
objected to the sale and transference of Lot 4 to the third party.
He applied for and was granted a rule nisi calling upon the
trustee to show cause why a final order should not be made
interdicting transfer of Lot 4 to a third party and directing
that it
be transferred to him. The interim relief was granted to the
appellant pending the confirmation or discharge of the rule nisi.
The application was opposed and on the return date the rule nisi
was discharged. The appellant now appeals against the judgment
discharging the rule nisi.
In discharging the
rule nisi the learned judge had this to say:
The point involved in the application is a short one. It is,
whether the applicant has a right to the transfer of Lot 4 into
his
name. He entered into a contract of sale with a person who became
insolvent before performing the personal obligation of transferring
the immovable property to him.
At the time the
insolvents estate was sequestrated, the applicant had no real
rights in the land. The dominium of the land lay with the
insolvent. The applicant only had a personal right to claim
transfer of the land from the insolvent.
Later on in his judgment the learned judge reasoned as follows:
The trustee was vested with the ownership of the immovable
property registered in the insolvents name by virtue of the
sequestration
order. He took over the dominium of the land
for the benefit of all creditors of the insolvent estate. Unlike
the insolvent whose duties towards the applicant were
governed by the
terms of the contract of sale entered into personally the right and
duties of the trustee were governed by the Insolvency
Act [Chapter
6:04]. His obligations were not of a personal nature as were those
assumed by the insolvent under the contract of
sale. He took over
the ownership of the immovable property registered in the name of the
insolvent in an official capacity and
had to deal with it in the best
interests of all creditors.
The position of a
purchaser of land who paid the purchase price but had not received
transfer of the property at the date of sequestration
of the sellers
estate is that he has no right at common law to the transfer of the
land. The purchaser is not entitled to prevent
the trustee in an
insolvent estate from transferring the property to a third party if
that is in the best interests of creditors.
Ex parte
Singleton 1963 R & N 1.
In Harris v Trustee
of Buissinne (1850) 2 Menzie 105 the plaintiff entered into a
contract of sale with Buissinne in terms of which he bought
the latters house for ?1 050,400 of which it was stipulated
should be paid immediately in cash, and
for the balance of ?650 the
plaintiff agreed to pass a mortgage bond in favour of the directors
of a Savings Bank. On the same
date the plaintiff paid Buissinne
the ?400 he took possession of the house. Buissinne was
unable to give the plaintiff transfer of the house so that he might
perform his obligation to execute a mortgage in favour of
the Savings
Bank. The plaintiff took out summons against Buissinne who
surrendered his estate as insolvent and it was placed under
sequestration. In an action in which the plaintiff prayed for
an
order condemning Buissinne to give him a legal transfer, the
trustee of the insolvent estate pleaded that he was not liable to
give transfer to plaintiff.
Giving judgment for the
trustee of the insolvent estate the court said at pp 107-108:
By the law of Holland, the dominium or jus in re of
immovable property can only be conveyed by transfer made coram
lege loci and this species of transfer is as essential to divest
the seller of and invest the buyer with the dominium or jus
in re of immovable property as actual tradition is to convey the
dominium of movables and that the delivery of the actual
possession of immovable property has no force or legal effect
whatever in transferring
its dominium.
Consequently, the
agreement of sale between Harris and Buissinne and the
delivery of the possession of the house by Buissinne to
Harris, gave Harris nothing more than a jus ad rem and a
personal claim against Buissinne to convey the jus in re
to him by transfer coram lege loci. And, therefore, on the
day on which Buissinnes estate was placed under
sequestration the dominium of the house in question was still
vested in Buissinne and then formed part of his estate and
that by the order placing his estate under sequestration this house
became instantly and wholly
vested in the Master and ultimately in
the trustee for behoof (benefit) of the creditors of Buissinne.
On these grounds it
followed that Harris had only a personal claim against Buissinnes
estate for the damage which he has sustained by the non-fulfillment
of his undertaking to perfect the sale by making legal transfer
of
the house to Harris and for restitution of that part of the price
which he has paid, and in respect of this personal claim, he
has no
preference on the house in question, or on any other part of the
estate, and is only entitled to be ranked concurrently with
the other
personal creditors of Buissinne.
As pointed out above,
there was no endorsement on the title deed that the piece of land
sold to the applicant by the insolvent was
subject to a contract of
sale by instalments. Had such an endorsement been made in terms of
section 64 of the Deeds Registries
Act [Chapter 20:05] and all the
other requirements prescribed thereunder met, the applicant would
have had a statutory right to take
transfer of the land subject to
the payment of the outstanding balance under the prior real right
secured by the registered mortgage
bond.
Without the protection
provided by an endorsement on the title deed in terms of section 64
of the Act, the applicant had no right
to demand transfer of the land
into his name once the trustee decided that the transfer of the
immovable property to him was not
in the best interests of all the
creditors of the insolvent estate and elected to sell the property to
a third party. The court
has no power in the circumstances to
impose on the trustee a duty which the law says he does not owe the
applicant.
In proving his claim
for $25 000 against the insolvent estate and receiving a dividend of
$7 500 on that claim, the applicant pursued
the remedy consonant with
his position as a concurrent creditor of the insolvent estate. He
had no legal basis however upon which
to demand transfer of Lot 4 of
subdivision L of Stand 178 from the trustee. He also had no right
to prevent the trustee from transferring
the property to a third
party.
The provisional order
granted on 12 March 1999 is therefore discharged with costs.
I entirely agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the
learned judge in the court a quo. The appellant has no leg
to stand on. In the Notice of Appeal and Heads of Argument the
appellant sought to rely on the provisions
of the Contractual
Penalties Act [Chapter 8:04]. A perusal of that Act clearly shows
that it has no relevance to the issue that
was before the court.
That Act deals with contractual rights terminated by way of breach of
contract and not by insolvency as in
casu. The appellant
also sought to rely on the South African Sale of Land on Instalments
Act 72/71. That Act only applies to agreements
of sale in South
Africa and has no application in Zimbabwe. The numerous South
African cases cited by the appellant deal with the
interpretation of
the South African Act. The cases are totally irrelevant and no
useful purpose will be served by discussing them
in this judgment.
In Zimbabwe the rights of the parties in a contract of sale of land
by instalments is regulated by the Deeds
Registries Act [Chapter
20:05] (the Act). Section 64 of the Act provides as follows:
64 Sale of land on instalments
(1) Where land is sold in terms of a written contract whereby the
purchase price is payable in three or more instalments, the registrar
shall, upon the lodging with him in terms of this section of the
written consent of the registered owner and the purchaser, endorse
on
the title deed of the land concerned that such land is subject to the
contract.
(2) The endorsement in
terms of subsection (1) against the title deed of any land shall
confer on the purchaser of the land concerned
subject to this section
and to any prior real rights attaching to the land, the following
rights
(a) in the event of the insolvency, assignment or liquidation of the
sellers estate or the vesting of the sellers estate in
a
trustee or assignee in terms of the law relating to insolvency or a
proposed sale in execution of the land, and upon him notifying
his
election thereof within three months of the insolvency assignment,
liquidation or attachment of the land, as the case may be,
to the
trustee, assignee, liquidator or officer charged with the sale of
the land, either
(i) a charge over the land in favour of the purchaser for the amount
of any instalments and deposit paid by him to the seller and
for the
value of any improvements effected upon the land by the purchaser and
valued in terms of subsection (4) less the amount,
if any, referred
to in paragraph (d) of subsection (5); or
(ii) a right to take transfer of the land subject to the payment of
the outstanding balance of the purchase price under the contract
or,
if the land is encumbered under a prior real right securing a
monetary obligation, to the payment of the outstanding balance
under
the prior real right whichever is the greater:
Provided that where
the land sold under the contract is a portion of land the whole of
which is subject to such a prior real right,
the purchaser shall be
entitled to take transfer of the land upon payment of the sum
referred to in subsection (3) or the balance
of the purchase price
under the contract, whichever is the greater;
(b) where the provisions of paragraph (a) do not apply or he has not
made an election in terms of that paragraph, the right enforceable
against all person whatsoever to abide by the contract and to take
transfer of the land upon fulfilment of the conditions of the
contract.
The above section stipulates
that the rights conferred by s 64 only accrue upon the registration
of the agreement of sale with the
Registrar of Deeds. Failure to
register the agreement is fatal to the accrual of the rights. The
agreement of sale between the
appellant and Ngwenya suggests the
parties were aware of the need to register the agreement. Clause 6
of the agreement provides
for the payment of costs of such
registration. The reference to s 62 of the Act in clause 6 appears
to be erroneous as it appears
that the intention was to refer to s 64
of the Act. The agreement of sale between the appellant and Ngwenya
was never registered
in terms of s 64 of the Act. This is fatal to
the appellants case and is the source of the appellants
problems.
While the appellants
sense of grievance is understandable, namely, that purchasers of the
other sub-divisions of the same stand
from Ngwenya in similar
circumstances were allowed by the trustee to conclude their
agreements, while he was not, the fact of the
matter is that the
appellant was the author of his own misfortune. He should have
registered his agreement of sale with Ngwenya
in terms of s 64 of the
Act.
Finally I wish to comment on
the voluminous documents filed by the appellant. This is not
permissible and should be punished by
an appropriate order as to
costs. The Court, however, notes that the appellant is a self actor
and is prepared to allow him some
latitude. Also, the appellants
remarks about the presiding judge are simply unacceptable and border
on contempt of court which
calls for an appropriate sanction.
However, the Court again decided to err on the side of leniency
because of the apparent injustice
that the appellant received at the
hands of the trustee. Let the appellant be warned that in future he
will not get away with impunity
for such deplorable conduct.
In the result the
appeal is dismissed with costs.
ZIYAMBI JA: I agree.
GWAUNZA JA: I agree.
Coghlan & Welsh, first and second respondents legal
practitioners