REPORTABLE ZLR (16)
Judgment No. SC 14/07
Civil Appeal No. 313/05
BUSINESS
EQUIPMENT CORPORATION v FARAI MTETWA
SUPREME COURT OF
ZIMBABWE
SANDURA JA, GWAUNZA JA
& GARWE JA
HARARE, JANUARY 15, &
JULY 16, 2007
H Zhou, for the
appellant
The respondent in
person
GWAUNZA JA: This is an appeal against a judgment of the Labour
Court, in terms of which the appellants application for rescission
of an earlier default judgment against it, was dismissed.
The background to the
dispute is as follows. The respondent was dismissed from the
appellants employ for misconduct (the
first dismissal). He
appealed against his dismissal to the Negotiating Committee, which
ordered the appellant to reinstate him
without loss of pay or
benefits. No alternative order for damages in lieu of
reinstatement was made.
The appellant,
aggrieved at the order to reinstate the respondent, appealed against
such order to the Labour Court, which however,
dismissed the appeal
and upheld the Negotiating Committees decision for the appellant
to reinstate the respondent without loss
of salary or benefits.
When the respondent subsequently presented himself for duty, he was
handed a letter in which it was stated that the appellant was
going
to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. He thereafter stayed away
from work but proceeded to file an appeal to the Supreme
Court
against the order of reinstatement without the alternative of
damages. It is not clear from the evidence when the appellant
abandoned its appeal to the Supreme Court. Nor is it clear when the
respondent, who initially had exhibited a willingness to return
to
work in compliance with the Labour Courts order, had decided to
opt for damages instead. What is clear is that it took the
appellant
a period of some seven months to demand from the respondent that he
report for duty or face dismissal. Significantly, the
appellant knew
by then that the respondent had - correctly or otherwise filed
his appeal to the Supreme Court.
In that appeal, the
respondent sought an order for payment of damages as an alternative
to reinstatement. As indicated, pending
the hearing of appeal by
this Court, the respondent did not report for work. It was then of
the view that the noting of the appeal
against the order of
reinstatement had the effect of suspending its enforcement. The
appellant, being of a different view, directed
the respondent to
report for work, and when he did not do so, instituted disciplinary
proceedings against him. These culminated
in the respondent being
dismissed from his employment with effect from 14 May 2002 (the
second dismissal). The respondent
thereafter appealed against
such dismissal - but unsuccessfully - to the Local Joint Committee
and later, the Negotiating Committee.
He then appealed to the Labour
Court. On the date of hearing of the matter, the appellant in
casu was in default, and the Labour Court, which was satisfied
notice of the hearing had properly been served on the appellants
legal
practitioners, proceeded to consider the matter on the merit.
The court found that the respondent in casu had a reasonable
excuse for failing to report for work during the pendency of his
appeal to the Supreme Court, and accordingly upheld
the appeal. The
appellant later sought rescission of that judgment and, having failed
in its quest, has now appealed to this Court.
In the meantime, the
respondents appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he sought an
order for damages in lieu of re-instatement,
was dismissed (SC
25\04). The basis of such dismissal is set out in the Supreme Court
judgment as follows:
The question of the breakdown of the relationship between the
parties was never raised by the appellant in the lower fora.
Indeed, as stated in the notice of appeal, it was in the closing
submissions by counsel at the end of the hearing before the (Labour)
Tribunal that this point was first taken. No evidence of the
breakdown of the relationship having been led, there was no evidence
upon which the Tribunal could find that the relationship between the
parties had broken down and consider making an order in terms
of the
proviso. Accordingly, the appeal is devoid of merit and it is
dismissed with costs.
From the foregoing it is evident that two separate court proceedings
were at one time being pursued by the parties. There is however
no
doubt that the finding of the Supreme Court in the matter concerning
the respondents first dismissal has a bearing on the dispute
concerning his second dismissal.
As already pointed out, the respondent successfully challenged his
first dismissal before the Negotiating Committee, which ordered
his
reinstatement. When the appellant sought to have the Negotiating
Committees determination reversed on appeal to the Labour
Court,
the respondent, who had neither filed a cross appeal against the
Negotiating Committees determination, nor placed before
the Labour
Court evidence indicating a breakdown in the relationship between the
parties, left it until the stage of closing submissions
to mention,
for the first time, that he preferred damages to reinstatement. The
Labour Court correctly disregarded this belated
claim, if such it
was, and upheld the Negotiating Committees decision to reinstate
the respondent. Quite clearly, the respondents
appeal to the
Supreme Court was doomed to failure.
It is against this
background that the respondents second dismissal must be
considered.
The appellant contends that, contrary to the finding by the court a
quo, it was not in wilful default when it failed to attend the
hearing of this matter in the court a quo. The appellant
disputes the court a quos finding that proper service of
the notice of hearing had been effected through the appellants
legal practitioners. It is also argued that the court a
quo erred in finding, as it did, that there was proof on record
that the appellant had been properly served with the notice of
hearing.
Further, that the court gave no indication of the type of
service referred to.
I find there is merit
in these contentions. The court a quo, referring to the issue
of the notice of set down, noted as follows on p 2 of the judgment:
The record shows that the notice of set down was date stamped 23
July 2004. Service was effected B/H ie by hand on
the
applicants legal practitioners.
However, as correctly stated in the appellants heads of
argument, while the notice of set down may have been date stamped 23
July 2004, the appellants legal practitioners, almost two weeks
later on 6 August 2004, indicated in a letter to the respondents
legal practitioners, that such notice had not been received by them.
The letter read in part as follows:
We have your letter of 2 August 2004 and wish to point out that we
have not as yet been served with any notice of further set
down of
this matter. We will naturally deal with the matter in the event
that it is indeed set down for finalization.
It is pertinent to note that the observation by the court a quo
concerning the date stamp of 23 July 2004, and service by hand, does
not indicate whose date stamp it was nor whether someone at
the
appellants legal practitioners office had signed the notice of
set down to indicate acknowledgement of receipt. The appellants
legal practitioner, Mr Mahlangu, in his affidavit denied ever
receiving the notice of set down. I find, too, that the letter from
the appellants legal practitioners
to the effect that they would
deal with the matter once they received notice of set down, did
not accord with an intention
to wilfully default in attending the
hearing.
Given these
circumstances, I find that the finding by the court a quo that
the appellant was in wilful default is not supported by the evidence
before the court. There is no evidence, in other words,
to suggest
that the appellant deliberately, and with full knowledge of the date
of set down, took the decision not to attend the
hearing in question.
The appellant contends
further that the court a quo should have rescinded the
judgment in question, given that it, (appellant) had proved the bona
fides of its defence on the merits, which carried prospects of
success.
I do not find merit in
this argument.
In its default judgment
upholding the respondents appeal (against his second dismissal)
the Labour Court ruled as follows:
The employee had a
reasonable excuse for his failure to report for work. He was waiting
the outcome of an appeal. As such the
decision of the Negotiating
Committee is set aside. The appeal is accordingly upheld. The
parties are to await the outcome of the
appeal which was noted with
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court duly dismissed the respondents appeal, an
outcome whose effect was to confirm the earlier orders of the
Negotiating
Committee and the Labour Court, for the appellant to
reinstate the respondent without the option of damages.
The court a quo
in its judgment cited authorities to support the proposition that
under common law the noting of an appeal has the effect of suspending
the decision appealed against
where the Legislature was silent on the effect of an appeal. Nowhere
in its papers does the appellant deny that the respondent had
properly noted an appeal with this court. Far from denying it, the
appellant filed opposing heads of argument to that appeal. The
appeal was registered as such by this Court, and all relevant
processes to have it heard were followed. It was duly heard albeit
at the end of the hearing, dismissed.
In other words, it was
an appeal considered to be properly before the Court. The appellant,
while stating that the respondent sought
to appeal against an order
that was, in fact, in his favour, has advanced no argument to justify
a departure from the law concerning
the effect of an appeal on the
judgment appealed against. It has not been suggested, for instance,
that the leave of the court to
execute the judgment pending an appeal
against it, had been granted.
There was another
pertinent consideration. The appellant does not deny that it
addressed a letter to the respondent to the effect
that it wished to
file an appeal against the Labour Courts determination that he
should be reinstated without loss of salary or
benefits. Nor was the
respondents averment that he was given that letter on the day he
sought to attend duty, disputed. The
record also shows that it took
the appellant almost seven months to inform the respondent that he
should attend duty, and that during
that period he was not informed
of the appellants change of heart regarding its proposed appeal to
the Supreme Court. His own
appeal aside, the respondent could not,
therefore, have reasonably been expected to know that he would be
welcomed back to work.
Against this
background, the finding by the court a quo that the respondent
had reasonable cause to stay away from work pending the determination
of his appeal to the Supreme Court cannot
be faulted. His dismissal
on that basis was therefore unjustified.
I find, in the final
analysis, that while the court a quo may have erred in its
finding that the appellant was in wilful default, it was correct in
its finding regarding the bona fides or lack thereof,
of the appellants defence on the merits. The appeal must,
therefore, fail.
For the avoidance of
doubt, the respondent is entitled to reinstatement to his former
employment with the appellant, without loss
of salary or benefits,
that being the effect of the judgment of this Court in case SC 25/04.
In the result, the
appeal is dismissed with costs.
SANDURA JA: I agree
GARWE JA: I agree
Gill, Godlonton & Gerrans, appellants legal
practitioners