The court considered an application for review concerning the forfeiture of gold whereby the respondent was found guilty of contravening s 8(1) of the Gold Trade Act. The accused owned a jewelry shop whereby he traded gold. The Zimbabwe Republic Police Gold Squad regularly visited the accused’s shop to ensure that he was complying with the act. On one visit, it became clear that the accused had not registered 8.59g of gold into the register as required by the act. 

The court found that after the conviction of the accused, a review of the record revealed that the learned magistrate had not made an order for the forfeiture of the gold. Despite the accused attempting to secure the return of the gold, he was informed it had been forfeited to the state. Pursuant to the accused’s investigation, and obtaining the record again, the record appeared to make reference to the forfeiture of the gold. 

The court found that the only explanation was that the trial magistrate entered the forfeiture clause well after the sentence had been imposed and the accused started claiming the gold.  In conclusion, the court found that the conviction and sentence were adequate but held that the forfeiture clause contained in the record be set aside and the accused be sentenced afresh. 

This was a case in the High Court where two accused persons were convicted on their own pleas of guilty to contravening s 368 of the Mines and Minerals Act by the Provincial Magistrate.

Having found special circumstances as would entitle the trial court to impose a sentence other than the mandatory one provided in the act; the magistrate sentenced each of the accused persons to 24 months imprisonment of which 12 months imprisonment were suspended for 5 years on condition of good future behaviour. The remaining 12 months were suspended on condition they each complete 420 hours of community service.

The issue before the court was to determine the special circumstances as found by the trial court. The judge applied the rule of Judge J Ebrahim in S v Mbewe and others 1988 (1) ZLR 7(H) to make the determination. The judge’s view was that the trial court erred because the issues put up by the accused were mitigating factors of general application which clearly did not amount to special circumstances at all.

Consequently, the judge ordered that the conviction of the two accused persons stood, and set aside the finding of the trial magistrate that there were special circumstances; and the sentence. The judge also ordered the matter to be sent back to the trial court for it to recall the accused persons and impose the appropriate sentence according to law by deducting from it 53 days equivalent to 420 hours community service already served.

The court considered an application for a provisional order seeking an interim interdict restraining the respondents from interfering in the applicant’s mining operations.  A dispute arose between the parties concerning the boundary between their two claims. It was argued that the commissioner found that the respondent was working outside one of his claims and inside one claim belonging to the applicant. 

The court considered whether the interim relief sought should be granted. The court found that the respondent acknowledged that the claim belonged to the applicant but that the commissioner erred in determining that the boundary was within the applicant’s claim. The court held that the applicant had established a prima facie right which required legal protection and that the respondent was entitled to challenge the commissioner’s determination. 

The court found further that the respondent did not exercise their right to challenge the determination by the commissioner but rather chose to write letters of complaint which were not sufficient. The court stated that the respondent ought to have formally challenged the commissioner’s boundary determination and in the circumstances could not legally resist the interdict sought by the applicant. The court therefore granted the interdict.

The court considered an application for review concerning the decision handed down by the Magistrate’s Court on whether the accused’s case should have been discharged. The facts were that whilst the complainant was being investigated by the police for theft by finding of gold, the accused, a magistrate, approached the complainant and solicited him for a bribe to dispose of his case. The complainant made a report to the police who set a trap to arrest the accused, after she had received the money.

The defence applied for a discharge of the case, which was granted on the basis that the state witnesses were not truthful.
The court considered whether the magistrate’s decision to the discharge the case was exercised judicially. The court found that the trial court had a discretion to discharge or continue with the trial, and that such discretion ought to have be exercised judicially. 

The court stated that a discharge was appropriate where: there was no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence; or no evidence on which a reasonable court would convict; or where the evidence was so unreliable that no reasonable court could act on it.   The court held that there was nothing indicating that the witnesses had been discredited and that it was a misdirection for the magistrate to treat the assertions made by the accused as though they were evidence. Accordingly, the court set aside the accused’s discharge and referred the matter back to court for continuation of trial.