The court considered an urgent application for an order interdicting the first respondent from carrying on mining operations on the applicants’ mineral claims. At some point, the applicants and the first respondent had business dealings involving minerals from those claims. The respondent then went on to register mining claims over a piece of land which included the first applicant’s mining claims. The respondent argued that the matter was not urgent, and that the relief sought was not competent as it was final in effect. 

The court considered whether the applicants had established a right to the relief sought. The court observed that the relief sought was an interim interdict, the requirements for which were: a clear right; irreparable harm; balance of convenience in favour of granting the relief, and no other satisfactory remedy. The court found that the respondent intended to mine on the applicants claim, and although the mining hadn’t commenced, the applicants could not wait until it acted and had established the prejudice likely to be suffered. 

In determining the balance of convenience, the court weighed the prejudice to the applicant if the interdict was not granted against the harm to the respondent if the relief was granted. In this instance, as the mining activities were not being carried on yet, there was no prejudice to the respondent. Accordingly, the court found that the requirements for the interdict were met and the application succeeded.

The applicant and first respondent were the registered holders of two respective mining claims when it became apparent that the first respondent had been mining on the applicant’s property under the mistaken belief that it was hers. The dispute was referred to the second respondent who made a determination and advised the parties of the right to appeal to the Secretary for Mines and Mining Development. On appeal, the Secretary made another determination on the dispute which prompted an application for review. 

The applicant contested the validity of the secretary’s decision and prayed for an interdict to restrain the first respondent from carrying on her mining activities pending the review.

The court considered whether the application to the second respondent and subsequently to the Secretary were procedurally proper under the Mines and Minerals Act; in order to determine whether the applicant had an arguable claim for review. 

The court interpreted ss 341, 346 and 362 of the Act, and found that the second respondent heard and determined the dispute as a mining commissioner acting under delegated powers. It was also found that an appeal against the decision of the mining commissioner should lie to the High Court and not to the office of the Secretary. The court therefore held that the appeal to the Secretary was a nullity and that the applicant had established an arguable claim.

Accordingly, the court granted the interim interdict pending determination of the matter.

The applicant instituted proceedings by urgent chamber applications seeking interim relief against the respondents relating to mining activities in Antelope 68 Mine.

The court ruled on three preliminary objections by the first and second respondents that opposed the validity of the certificate of urgency, the urgency of the matter and that domestic remedies provided in the Mines and Minerals Act were not exhausted.

Firstly, the court noted that a certificate of urgency differs from an affidavit. It was held that the rules allowed the execution of a certificate of urgency by a legal practitioner who is employed by the firm of attorneys which represents the applicant. It was further noted that the validity of the certificate urgency is a cause of concern only when a chamber application is not served to the respondent.

Secondly, the court found that a party must show good cause for preferential treatment that comes with certifying a matter as urgent. The court held that the applicant failed to account for his failure to seek relief on an urgent basis at the very latest soon after the early March invasion when the respondents continued to go to the mine.  Consequently, it was held that the matter lost its urgency when the applicant failed to treat it as urgent.

Accordingly, the court ordered that the matter be struck off the roll of urgent matters and did not find it necessary to deal with the third objection. The applicant was also ordered to pay costs.

The court considered an application for an interim interdict preventing the respondents from interfering with the applicant’s business and to remove their security personnel. 

The applicant held a licence to deal in scrap metal, particularly to acquire, sell or deal in copper. Police officers, accompanied by the 1st respondent attended at the applicant’s warehouse and advised of its intention to search for certain materials which were suspected to have been stolen from the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent ensured that security were placed at the premises to guard the warehouse until such time as the warrant had been obtained.

The court stated that the requirements for an interim interdict were: 1) a clear right, 2) a well-grounded apprehension of harm if the relief was not granted, 3) balance of convenience, and 4) absence of any alternative remedy.

The court found that there was an alternative remedy available since dealing in copper was a closely controlled trade and that a holder was obliged to keep proper records of the copper in its possession, thus it should have no difficult in accounting for any loss. 

The court weighed the prejudice to the applicant if the relief was refused against the prejudice to the respondent if granted. It observed that the purpose of placing the security was to ensure that the premises was safe and no items were lost. If relief was granted, this protection would be lost. Thus, the balance of convenience did not favour the applicant. Accordingly,  the application was dismissed.