The court considered an application to set aside the National Water Authority Regulations and tariffs on the ground that they were ultra vires and violated the applicants’ rights. 

The applicants’ business operations involved sugar-cane growing and sugar processing. They concluded two agreements with the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), which related to the supply of water. It was a term of the agreement that the parties would, together, review charges for raw water, and should they fail to agree, the respondent would fix the prices.  Subsequently, ZINWA addressed a letter advising the applicants of their intention to review the charges. The respondent unilaterally increased the tariffs and failed to notify the applicants. The respondent argued that in terms of the ZINWA Act, she had the authority to impose tariffs for water charges and that the regulations did not violate the applicants’ rights. 

The court considered whether the respondent had acted lawfully in imposing the water tariffs. It found that the government reviewed the water charges, and not ZINWA which was lawfully established to review the tariffs in as far as the applicant was concerned.  

The court found that the respondent could not unilaterally increase water tariffs, unless ZINWA had made application to it to justify the increase. In this case, the respondent failed to notify the applicants, nor did she give them an opportunity to respond. The court concluded that the respondent acted ultra vires by increasing the tariffs and her actions were unlawful. Accordingly, the application was upheld

The applicant and first respondent were the registered holders of two respective mining claims when it became apparent that the first respondent had been mining on the applicant’s property under the mistaken belief that it was hers. The dispute was referred to the second respondent who made a determination and advised the parties of the right to appeal to the Secretary for Mines and Mining Development. On appeal, the Secretary made another determination on the dispute which prompted an application for review. 

The applicant contested the validity of the secretary’s decision and prayed for an interdict to restrain the first respondent from carrying on her mining activities pending the review.

The court considered whether the application to the second respondent and subsequently to the Secretary were procedurally proper under the Mines and Minerals Act; in order to determine whether the applicant had an arguable claim for review. 

The court interpreted ss 341, 346 and 362 of the Act, and found that the second respondent heard and determined the dispute as a mining commissioner acting under delegated powers. It was also found that an appeal against the decision of the mining commissioner should lie to the High Court and not to the office of the Secretary. The court therefore held that the appeal to the Secretary was a nullity and that the applicant had established an arguable claim.

Accordingly, the court granted the interim interdict pending determination of the matter.

This was an application for an interim relief of setting aside the first respondent’s directive that ordered the applicant to cease their diamond mining operations after the applicant’s rights in a ceded portion of a special grant 4765 expired.

The applicant argued that clause 8 of the grant allowed it to work the sites which were ceded to it for an indefinite period of time. The first respondent countered this on the basis of s 291 of the Mines and Minerals Act that requires special grants to be issued for a specified period of time.

Further, the first respondent argued that no real cession had occurred since the applicant as the holder of the ceded and ‘residual’ portions of the grant were operating outside the law.

The court noted that the first respondent gave the applicants a 5-year period to renew the grant when they allowed the grant to operate outside the law before declaring it invalid, and the applicants still failed to renew it. For this reason, the applicant was found to have approached the court with ‘dirty hands’ since it was in breach of the condition of the special grant and s 29 of the act.

The applicant failed to prove that the first respondent acted unlawfully, unreasonably or disproportionately for the court to apply its review discretion. The court, therefore, held that the first respondent was right in exercising its administrative discretion and pronouncing what the law said.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.

The court considered an application for review concerning the forfeiture of gold whereby the respondent was found guilty of contravening s 8(1) of the Gold Trade Act. The accused owned a jewelry shop whereby he traded gold. The Zimbabwe Republic Police Gold Squad regularly visited the accused’s shop to ensure that he was complying with the act. On one visit, it became clear that the accused had not registered 8.59g of gold into the register as required by the act. 

The court found that after the conviction of the accused, a review of the record revealed that the learned magistrate had not made an order for the forfeiture of the gold. Despite the accused attempting to secure the return of the gold, he was informed it had been forfeited to the state. Pursuant to the accused’s investigation, and obtaining the record again, the record appeared to make reference to the forfeiture of the gold. 

The court found that the only explanation was that the trial magistrate entered the forfeiture clause well after the sentence had been imposed and the accused started claiming the gold.  In conclusion, the court found that the conviction and sentence were adequate but held that the forfeiture clause contained in the record be set aside and the accused be sentenced afresh.