The court considered a criminal appeal, where the applicants had been charged for contravening s7(1)(a) or (b) of the Communal Land Act, by occupying or using communal land without lawful authority. The applicants pleaded guilty and were convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $5000 or 30 days in prison. The appellants appealed the conviction on the ground that the court committed an irregularity by failing to proceed in terms of the correct procedure. 

They contended that by entering a guilty plea, the court had a duty to safeguard the fair trial rights of the accused by adopting a procedure which was most likely to suggest a defence where there was one.

The court considered whether the appellant’s conviction was lawful. It observed that with unrepresented accused persons, there was the ever-present likelihood that out of ignorance of the law, a person would admit to charges of a complex nature out of a desire to draw sympathy of the police or the courts and the onus was upon the court to choose a procedure which would have given the appellants a possible defence.

The court found that the conviction was wrong and remitted the matter back to the lower court. In addition, the court below would be required to take cognizance of s 16 of the Act which required that following a conviction, an order for eviction be granted. Accordingly, the appeal succeeded.

The applicants were former employees on a farm that had been expropriated for resettlement and had been allocated to other beneficiaries. They did not vacate the farm when it was expropriated and continued to live and work on it.
The respondent had ordered that they vacate the farm as they were occupying the land unlawfully. They refused to do as they held that as part of their conditions of employment with the previous owner, he gave them accommodation, food and facilities. They maintained that the acquisition of the farm had not meant the automatic termination of their contract of employment, rather that it had resulted in a transfer of the farming undertaking and consequently, the beneficiaries had assumed the position of employer, with the concomitant responsibility of maintaining terms and conditions similar to those they previously enjoyed.

The court first had to decide whether a constitutional issue arose before the Court, if not then there would be no need to hear the matter any further.  Secondly, whether the applicants were guilty of a criminal offence and if so, whether the applicants would remain employees of the new farm owners.
The court held that Section 3 of the Gazetted Lands Act had been scrutinized by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions and was found to be constitutional. Therefore, the court re-affirmed  the provision that criminalized their unlawful occupation and held that there was no constitutional issue to be referred.

The matter was dismissed.

The first plaintiff concluded a tribute agreement with the second and third defendants that was to last for ten years. The Mining Commissioner rejected this agreement since it was not registrable. This agreement was replaced by a three-year tribute agreement. When this agreement expired, the first plaintiff entered into another agreement with the second plaintiff and they sought an order registering this agreement and the eviction of the second and third defendant. The eviction order was opposed on grounds that the first agreement was still valid.

In interpreting s289 and 290 of the Mines and Minerals Act on tribute agreements, the court made a distinction between directory and peremptory provisions. The court noted that it is impossible to lay down any conclusive test to distinguish the two provisions. However, provisions in negative form and containing penal sanctions are to be regarded as peremptory rather than directory. The court also noted that the intention of the legislature is to be considered when distinguishing the two.

The court found that the provisions were couched in negative form and that their contravention was to be visited with penal sanctions, hence peremptory. Additionally, it was found that the approval was meant to protect the interests of the tributor and to avoid premature cessation of mining operations.

Accordingly, the court declared that the first agreement was invalid and unenforceable; and that the second agreement was valid but had expired. Consequently, the second and third defendants were ordered to vacate or be evicted.