Minerals, oil and gas

S v Chasweka (HH 48-17 CA 1031/13) [2017] ZWHHC 48 (23 January 2017);

1

HH 48-17

CA 1031/13

 

LUKE CHASWEKA

versus

THE STATE

 

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

CHATUKUTA & MUSAKWA JJ

HARARE, 11 July 2016 & 23 January 2017

 

 

 

Chamber Application

 

 

 

T Manashe, for the appellant

E Makoto, for the respondent

 

 

This case concerned an appeal against the appellant’s conviction and the decision to sentence him to six months imprisonment, of which 3 months were suspended for a period of 5 years on condition of future good behaviour.

The appellant, a self-admitted illegal gold dealer, approached three men to buy gold. After paying, he discovered that he bought fake gold. To recover his money, he lied to the police, indicating that he was robbed by the three men. The police arrested them and during their interrogation realized that the appellant had lied to them. The appellant was then arrested and admitted that he made a false report.

While the appellant pleaded guilty, he appealed against the sentence imposed arguing that it did not take into account mitigating factors. He also submitted that the court should have considered a fine as an alternative sentence.

The appeal court found that it should not lightly interfere with the lower court’s sentencing discretion. Further, that the lower court did take into account mitigating factors, such as the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty and was a first offender. It further noted that the court had to also consider aggravating factors, especially the fact that the appellant was an illegal gold dealer trying to use the police as debt collector.

The appeal court held that the lower court adequately took into account all relevant factors and imposed a fair sentence. 

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

S v Makanda (S.C. 119/83 Crim. Appeal No. 305/83) [1983] ZWSC 119 (01 November 1983);

Judgment No. S.C. 119/83    Crim. Appeal No. 305/83

ROUND MAKANDA v THE STATE

SUPREME COURT OP ZIMBABWE,

GEORGES, CJ, BECK, JA & GUBBAY, JA,

HARARE, NOVEMBER 1, 1983.

A.P. de Bourbon, for the appellant

P.J. Batty, for the respondent

 

The court considered an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The appellant had been convicted and sentenced for wrongfully, and unlawfully possessing 269 grains of concentrates containing gold, valued at $1 896,23 while not being the holder of a licence or permit, and not being the employee of any permit or licence holder, in contravention of s 3 of the Gold Trade Act. 

In considering the evidence, the court noted that a detective constable jumped over the fence towards the back of the house and saw the appellant (who had a smelting pot in his hand) and another person. The constable succeeded in grabbing a plastic bag protruding from the appellant's pocket as he ran through a gate, dropping two gold stones in the process. The appellant was later arrested, giving a warned and cautioned statement, in the presence of his legal practitioner. 

The court upheld that although the statement made it very clear that the appellant knew that gold was being smelted in his workshop, his defence was that he was unaware of that fact until the police were about to come on the scene. This explanation might have raised a modicum of doubt but since it had been confirmed some months later in the presence of the appellant's legal representative, it was inherently improbable. 

The court found that on that state of the evidence, it was quite clear that the conviction was fully justified on the facts and the appeal was thus dismissed.

Marange Resources (Pvt) Ltd. v Core Mining & Minerals (Pvt) Ltd. (IN LIQUIDATION) & Others (SC 37/16 Civil Appeal No. SC 208/13) [2016] ZWSC 37 (22 July 2016);

Judgment No. SC 37/16

Civil Appeal No. SC 208/13

1

 

REPORTABLE         (32)

 

MARANGE     RESOURCES     (PRIVATE)     LIMITED

v

The court considered an appeal against the High Court’s decision not to interdict arbitration proceedings. 

The facts leading to the appeal were that a joint venture was entered into by the appellant and two mining companies. A dispute subsequently arose which the appellant claimed rendered the contract void ab initio. The first respondent sought a declaration that the contract was valid and soon after, referred the dispute to arbitration. However, the parties failed to agree on an arbitrator and one was appointed by an arbitral institution. Although the appellant boycotted a pre-arbitration meeting, the arbitrator proceeded, identified preliminary issues, and ordered the parties to file submissions. This prompted the appellant to file an urgent application to prevent the arbitration proceedings. The High Court’s refusal grant the interdict is what the appellant appealed against.

Before considering the appeal, the court observed that it was strange that the there was no nexus between the relief sought in the court below and that sought on appeal. The court went on to point out that the appellant refused to correct an error in its citation of the respondent in the proceedings but instead sought to hold out the matter as undefended. This was an abuse of court process. On this basis alone the proceedings could not be sustained.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. The court held that the wrong citation was compounded by the appellant’s refusal to rectify the error and made an order for exemplary costs. 

KAS Foods (Pvt) Ltd. v Moyo & Another (HB 135-16 HC 1281-16) [2016] ZWBHC 135 (02 June 2016);

1

 

HB 135-16

HC 1281-16

KAS FOODS (PVT) LTD

versus

GLADYS MOYO

and

ACTING PROVINCIAL MINING DIRECTOR – MIDLANDS

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MATHONSI J

BULAWAYO 26 MAY 2016 AND 2 JUNE 2016

 

 

Urgent Chamber Application

 

V. Masvaya for the applicant

J. Magodora for the 1st respondent

Ms R. Hove for the 2nd respondent

 

 

This was an urgent chamber application by the applicant in the High Court to interdict the first respondent from carrying out mining operations on its claim; from interfering with its lawful mining operations; and to desist from acts of uncontrolled violence they had unleashed at the site.

The issue before the court was to determine whether the Mining Commissioner should revisit the same dispute. The first respondent contended that the matter was not urgent since the dispute between the parties had been resolved in favour of the first respondent by the Mining Commissioner. However, it was found that the respondent had been ordered to stop but had allegedly resumed illegal activity.

The court held that in terms of s345(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05] where both parties have agreed in writing, the Mining Commissioner should resolve the dispute regardless of the original jurisdiction of the High Court. It was also found that s346 confers upon the Mining Commissioner judicial power to hold a court in order to determine a dispute in the simplest, speediest and cheapest manner possible. The court held that the Mining Commissioner exercised judicial power including the rules of natural justice and that once he pronounced himself on a matter, he became functus officio and so cannot revisit the same dispute in order to review his own decision.

The court held that the applicant had exhibited proof of lawful registration of the mining claims. Consequently, the appeal succeeded.

Forbes & Thompson (Byo) (Pvt) Ltd. v ZINWA & Another (HB 154-16 HC 1148-16) [2016] ZWBHC 154 (16 June 2016);

1

 

HB 154-16

HC 1148-16

 

FORBES & THOMPSON (BULAWAYO) (PVT) LTD

versus

THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL WATER AUTHORITY

and

TIMOTHY KADYAMUSUMA

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MOYO J

BULAWAYO 11 MAY AND 16 JUNE 2016

 

 

Urgent Chamber Application

 

 

W. Ncube for the applicant

Adv. L. Nkomo for the respondent

 

 

The applicant in this High Court case was seeking interim orders that (1) the first and second respondent be ordered to restore the supply of water from Blanket Dam in Gwanda to the applicant’s mine; (2) the first and the second respondent be interdicted from interfering with the applicant’s possession of his water supply infrastructure without obtaining a court order to that effect. 

The facts were that the first and second respondent disconnected the water supply that fed the applicants mine and the neighbouring community. The applicants argued that the respondents infringed its right to water under s77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The respondents, on the other side, argued that the matter was not urgent, and they were entitled to disconnect the water supply as the applicant failed to pay the water bills, thereby ending the contract between them.

Thus, the main issue for determination was whether the applicant had satisfied the requirement for an interim order to be issued; 

On the first issue, the Court held that the applicant had satisfied the requirements for an interim order which are, (i) prima facie right; (ii) reasonable apprehension of irreparable injury; (iii) no alternative relief available; (iv) and the balance of convenience favouring the granting of the interdict. 

As a result, the interim order was allowed pending the main trial and the hearing of the interdict.

Mugomba v Rimbo & Others (HH380-16 HC 8811/13) [2016] ZWHHC 380 (29 June 2016);

1

HH380-16

HC 8811/13

 

FRANCIS MUGOMBA

versus

MAYOR RIMBO

and

RIMBO MINERALS (PVT) LTD

and

MINING COMMISSIONER

 

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MATANDA-MOYO J

HARARE, 30 September 2015 & 29 June 2016

 

 

 

Trial

 

 

 

F Chauke, for the plaintiff

F Musihairambwe, for the 1st & 2nd defendants

 

 

This was an application by the plaintiff seeking an order declaring the first and second defendants’ construction of a milling plant and prospecting activities as unlawful, for interfering with the plaintiff’s agricultural activities. 

The first defendant opposed the reliefs sought, on grounds that he was the lawful owner of the mining blocks.

The court first assessed the evidence and concluded that the defendants were not in compliance of the procedures set out under the Mines and Minerals Act, for registering the claims and the subsequent conversion into blocks. The court further held that the defendants failed to show any plan lodged with the Commissioner of Mines, as required under the Mines and Minerals Act. 

Lastly, the court determined whether the land in dispute was cleared on or before the registration of the blocks and whether such land is the only portion, suitable of for farming. After outlining the rights of various parties, the court concluded that the plaintiff had no right to clear the land pegged for mining. However, the court could not make a holding on whether the prospecting operations were interfering with the plaintiff’s agricultural activities. This is because the plaintiff failed to
clarify whether the cleared field was located 450 metres from the principal homestead. The court therefore referred this issue to the Mining Commissioner for investigation and report, according to s 345 of the Mines and Minerals Act.

The court ordered the defendants to stop mining operations without complying with the law and to pay costs.

S v Kurotwi & Another (HH 270-16 CRB 35-39/11) [2016] ZWHHC 270 (04 May 2016);

1

HH 270-16

CRB 35-39/11

 

THE STATE

versus

1. LOVEMORE KUROTWI

2. DOMINIC MUBAIWA

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

BHUNU J

HARARE, 15 February 2011, 13 February 2015 and 4 May 2016

 

Assessors:       1.         Mr Chidyausiku.       

                        2.         Mr Shenje.

 

Criminal trial

 

C. Mutangadura, for the State

Mrs B. Mtetwa, for the 1st accused

L. Uriri, for the 2nd accused

 

This was an application for the discharge of the accused persons for lack of evidence pursuant to s 198 (3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. The state had alleged that the accused persons were acting in common purpose through a series of fraudulent misrepresentations to the Government of Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and induced ZMDC to enter into a joint venture agreement of diamond mining with Core Mining (Pvt) Ltd. They fronted Benny Steinmeitz Group Resources (BSGR) as its guarantor and on that representation, the government approved a contract, it never would have otherwise approved. 

Relying on the parole evidence rule that posits that parties are strictly bound by the four corners of the contractual document and nothing outside it, the court held that both government and ZMDC cannot be heard to complain that they were duped into signing the contractual document under the mistaken belief that BSGR was standing as guarantor for Core Mining when the contractual document makes no mention of BSGR at all.

Court further held that the state closed its case without leading any evidence pertaining to the misrepresentations allegedly made by the accused concerning the due diligence exercise on Core Mining. That misrepresentation is a vital component of the crime of fraud without which the crime cannot be committed. The state having failed to establish a prima facie case against the accused, it was accordingly ordered that both accused be acquitted and discharged.

Moyo v Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Ltd. & Another (HH 280-16 HC 3736/16) [2016] ZWHHC 280 (11 May 2016);

1

HH 280-16

HC 3736/16

 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

PATSON MOYO

versus

FREDA REBECCA GOLD MINE LIMITED

and

ZHOMBE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRUST

and

WEIGHT GWESELA

and

MAKOMBE

and

CHARLES PARADZA

and

DESIRE TSHUMA

and

The applicant instituted proceedings by urgent chamber applications seeking interim relief against the respondents relating to mining activities in Antelope 68 Mine.

The court ruled on three preliminary objections by the first and second respondents that opposed the validity of the certificate of urgency, the urgency of the matter and that domestic remedies provided in the Mines and Minerals Act were not exhausted.

Firstly, the court noted that a certificate of urgency differs from an affidavit. It was held that the rules allowed the execution of a certificate of urgency by a legal practitioner who is employed by the firm of attorneys which represents the applicant. It was further noted that the validity of the certificate urgency is a cause of concern only when a chamber application is not served to the respondent.

Secondly, the court found that a party must show good cause for preferential treatment that comes with certifying a matter as urgent. The court held that the applicant failed to account for his failure to seek relief on an urgent basis at the very latest soon after the early March invasion when the respondents continued to go to the mine.  Consequently, it was held that the matter lost its urgency when the applicant failed to treat it as urgent.

Accordingly, the court ordered that the matter be struck off the roll of urgent matters and did not find it necessary to deal with the third objection. The applicant was also ordered to pay costs.

Tarathula v Techmate Engineering (Lilly Mine) Mine Manager & Others (HH 312-16 HC 4673/16) [2016] ZWHHC 312 (20 May 2016);

1

HH 312-16

HC 4673/16

 

FAKAZI SONNY TARUTHULA

versus

TECHMATE ENGINEERING (LILLY MINE) MINE MANAGER AND TOM

and

MALVERN PATIRAO

and

LILLY MIN AND MILLS (TECHMATE ENGINEERING) PVT LTD

and

OFFICER IN CHARGE KADOMA RURAL POLICE

and

OFFICER IN CHARGE CID MINERALS

and

PROVINCIAL MINING DIRECTOR KADOMA (NO)

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MANGOTA J

HARARE,11 and 20 May, 2016

 

 

The origin of the application is an interim interdict prohibiting the first, second and third respondents from carrying out mining activities and ordering the fourth and fifth respondents to clear illegals who were working at the mine. The first respondent sought a review of this order and got an interim interdict that ordered for the eviction of the applicant and prohibition from mining.

This application arose when the applicant sought direction from the judges in chambers for anticipation of a return date and also rescinding the eviction order.

The court applied Order 33 of the High Court Rules and held that the pending review suspended the operation of the order issued in the magistrate court. Consequently, the applicant could not exercise the rights conferred upon him unless the review was determined in his favor.
The court found that the mine lies in the applicant’s plot. However, the court found it important for peace to prevail at the mine and that both parties be removed from the mine pending resolution of their dispute.

The court held that the applicant was able to prove all the requirements of an interdict: he had a right to mine; he would suffer irreparable damage if the respondent continued with their mining operations; he had no alternative remedy and he proved his case on a balance of probabilities against the respondent.

Accordingly, the interdict was granted pending the resolution of the dispute and the security guards of both parties were ordered to guard the mine jointly. 

ANJIN Inv. (Pvt) Ltd. v Minister, Mines and Mining Development & Others (HH 228-16 HC 2183/16) [2016] ZWHHC 228 (30 March 2016);

1

HH 228-16

HC 2183/16

ANJIN INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED

versus

THE MINISTER OF MINES & MINING DEVELOPMENT

and

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

and

THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL

OF THE ZIMBABWE REPUBLIC POLICE

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MANGOTA J

HARARE, 7 and 30 March 2016

 

 

Urgent Chamber Application

 

 

P Ranchhod, for the applicant

L Uriri, for the 1st respondent

This was an application for an interim relief of setting aside the first respondent’s directive that ordered the applicant to cease their diamond mining operations after the applicant’s rights in a ceded portion of a special grant 4765 expired.

The applicant argued that clause 8 of the grant allowed it to work the sites which were ceded to it for an indefinite period of time. The first respondent countered this on the basis of s 291 of the Mines and Minerals Act that requires special grants to be issued for a specified period of time.

Further, the first respondent argued that no real cession had occurred since the applicant as the holder of the ceded and ‘residual’ portions of the grant were operating outside the law.

The court noted that the first respondent gave the applicants a 5-year period to renew the grant when they allowed the grant to operate outside the law before declaring it invalid, and the applicants still failed to renew it. For this reason, the applicant was found to have approached the court with ‘dirty hands’ since it was in breach of the condition of the special grant and s 29 of the act.

The applicant failed to prove that the first respondent acted unlawfully, unreasonably or disproportionately for the court to apply its review discretion. The court, therefore, held that the first respondent was right in exercising its administrative discretion and pronouncing what the law said.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.

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