Substantive rights

MDC-T v Officer Commanding Byo Central District Police N.O. & Others (HB 126/16 HC 1236/16) [2016] ZWBHC 126 (26 May 2016);

1

 HB 126/16

HC 1236/16

 

MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE – T

 

Versus

 

OFFICER COMMANDING BYO CENTRAL

DISTRICT POLICE N.O.

 

And

 

THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL

ZIMBABWE REPUBLIC POLICE N.O.

 

And

 

The applicants, the Movement for Democratic Change, sought an order to set aside the decision by the 1st respondent, the officer commanding Bulawayo Central District Police, that sanctioned their demonstration. The applicants notified the 1st respondent of their intention to conduct a peaceful demonstration, but the 1st respondent had refused their application on three grounds: 

  1. That a similar demonstration had not been successful
  2. That the environment was not conducive for political demonstrations of any form or character
  3. That the demonstration would be infiltrated by bad element

The court held that the 1st respondent’s actions breached the applicant’s rights to free expression and protest. The freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly was of such importance that the right could not be restricted in any way, on flimsy grounds.  A fair balance had to be struck on the one hand, the general interest requiring the protection of public safety and, on the other, the applicant’s freedom to demonstrate.

Accordingly, the application was granted.

Mutambara v AG & Another (Const. Application No. CCZ 28/11) [2015] ZWCC 11 (18 November 2015);

Judgment No. CCZ 11/15

Const. Application No. CCZ 28/11

1

REPORTABLE        (69)

 

 

 

ARTHUR     MUTAMBARA

vs

  1. THE     ATTORNEY     GENERAL     OF     ZIMBABWE
  2. COMMISSIONER     GENERAL     OF     POLICE

 

 

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ZIMBABWE

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC,

The applicant, who was then involved in the country’s politics and was a leader of an opposition party, wrote and caused to be published in an independent weekly newspaper, an article entitled “A shameful betrayal of national independence.” Jointly with a director and the editor of the newspaper in question, the applicant was arrested on allegations that they had contravened section 182 (1) (a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (the Act), in addition to section 31 (a) (iii) of the same Act. They were charged with the offence of publishing an article that was contemptuous of the High Court of Zimbabwe.

The applicant sought an order declaring that section 182(1) of the Act was in violation of his rights to freedom of expression, association and protection from discrimination and was therefore null and void.

The court noted that the applicant had a duty to respect the law that outlawed the conduct with which he was charged.  He was arrested because of this perceived breach of the law. He would escape the consequences of his conduct only if a court absolved him of all guilt, and not because of any notion of discrimination arising out of the fact that another person who might have engaged in similar conduct was not likewise charged with the same offence. A constitution, by its nature, is not likely to offer immunity to people who violate the law.

The court thus found that the limitation to rights to fundamental rights imposed by section 182(1) of the Act was a reasonable derogation from the right to freedom of association and was not excessive in relation to the objective to be attained by virtue of the limitation. 

Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

Knight v Ncube and Another (HC 3040/04) [2004] ZWBHC 120 (15 September 2004);

                                                                                    Judgment No. HB 120/04

The first respondent, in the company of people alleged to be members of the second respondent (a pressure group which had as some of its goals, “to protect indigenous business and this includes defaulting tenants), went to applicant’s (an estate agency in the business of managing immovable properties on behalf of landlords or property owners) premises. The second respondent was escorted by the Zimbabwe Republic Police details. They also made denouncing remarks.

This was an application seeking an interdict against the respondents to protect the applicant’s corporate status and its partners and employees from threats and assaults. 

The court determined whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for an interdict. The court also determined whether the application constituted an infringement of the respondent’s freedom of assembly, association and movement. 

The court held that the applicant established that there was an infringement of a legal right by the respondent, the absence of any other satisfactory remedy, and that the balance of convenience warranted the granting of an interdict.

The court disputed that the application constituted an infringement of the respondent’s freedom of assembly, association and movement as enshrined in section 21(1) and 22(2) of the Constitution. The court found that the application sought an order to not interfere with the applicant’s business and peace. It did not intend to prevent the membership of the respondent.

In conclusion, the court granted the interdict. The respondents were interdicted from entering the applicant's premises without the latter's consent and to keep peace towards the owner's business and employees.

Nyathi v Movement for Democratic Change (Bulawayo Provincial Youth Assembly) and Others (Case No. HC 186/12) [2012] ZWBHC 16 (25 January 2012);

BEKITHEMBA NYATHI

 

And

 

MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

(BULAWAYO PROVINCIAL YOUTH ASSEMBLY)

 

And

 

MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

 

Versus

 

THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE

(BULAWAYO CENTRAL POLICE STATION)

 

And

 

This was an application to seek a spoliation order to restore possession and control of political campaign materials. 

The court determined whether the applicants had made out a case for spoliation.

The court found that the applicants did not notify the police of their demonstration and prayer session under section 25(1)(a) of the Public Order and Security Act. Failure to notify the policy of a public gathering is an offence under section 25(5) of the Public Order and Security Act.

The court further found that the search and confiscation of the materials used during the demonstration by the police did not amount to taking the law into their hands. The police acted in accordance with 49, 51 and 52 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 

The application was accordingly dismissed with costs.

Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions v Officer Commanding Police Harare District and Another (HH 56-2002 ) [2002] ZWHHC 56 (10 April 2002);

HC 3452/2002

 

THE ZIMBABWE CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS

versus

THE OFFICER COMMANDING POLICE HARARE DISTRICT

and

THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

 

 

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

CHINHENGO J

HARARE  11 April 2002

 

 

Urgent Application

 

Adv.A.P. de Bourbon, for the applicant

Miss Zengeni, for the respondents

 

This was an urgent application seeking a provisional order prohibiting the respondents (the police) from interfering with the applicant’s (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions’) public gathering.

The court determined whether the applicant’s meeting constituted a public gathering within the meaning contemplated in sections 2 and 24 of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). The court found that the applicant's meeting was a trade union meeting, where public interest matters were not discussed. It therefore fell outside the ambit of public gathering referred to in section 24 of the POSA. Section 24 covers meetings held in public and in which the public can attend, and public interest issues are discussed. Consequently, the applicant’s meeting could not be classified as a meeting within sections 2 and 24 of POSA.

The court did not deal with the applicant's rights of freedom of expression, assembly and association because the respondents did not act in a way that violated those rights.

In conclusion, the court granted the order sought by the applicant. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of this application.

Khuphe v Officer In Charge Law and Order Section ZRP Bulawayo Central Station and Others (71/05) ((71/05)) [2005] ZWSC 79 (27 November 2005);





REPORTABLE (71)

Judgment No. SC. 79/05

Civil Appeal No. 71/05

The appellant was a duly elected Member of Parliament for the Makokoba Constituency in Bulawayo at the time of the incident that led to this appeal. She represented the Movement for Democratic Change, an opposition political party in Zimbabwe. When new constituency boundaries were announced in preparation for the general elections, the appellant called for a meeting of her constituents. More than eighty people from various wards of her constituency attended the meeting. Members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police arrived, broke up the meeting and arrested the appellant.

The appellant was charged with contravening section 24(6) of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) by holding a public meeting without notifying the authority concerned. She was placed on remand by the magistrate's court.

The appellant approached the high court seeking a declaration that section 24 of POSA does not oblige an organiser of a meeting to notify the regulating authority concerned if such meeting or gathering is a private meeting or gathering. The high court declined to grant the declaration hence this appeal.

The Supreme Court determined whether the appellant’s gathering was public or private. The court noted that if the gathering were private the appellant would have been acquitted. However, the court found the gathering to be a public one, and this a matter that should have been determined by the trial court.  It was neither for the high court to take on itself to determine, nor for the supreme court to do so on appeal. 

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Biti and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (34/2002) ((34/2002)) [2002] ZWSC 9 (27 February 2002);

REPORTABLE Z.L.R. (6)






Judgment No S.C. 9\2002

Civil

The applicants sought a declaration that section 24 of the Public Order and Security Act (the Act) contravened sections 20 and 21 of the Constitution that provide for the freedoms of expression, assembly and association.

Section 24 of the Act provides that the organiser of a public gathering is required to issue a well written notice, four days before an intended gathering, to the regulating authority for the area in which the meeting is to be held, and that if he fails to do so, he commits an offence.

The Supreme Court held that section 24 of the Act did not arbitrarily or excessively invade the enjoyment of the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly and association. Section 24 merely served two main purposes; the first was to afford the regulating authority a reasonable opportunity of anticipating or preventing any public disorder or any breach of the peace, and the second was to ensure that the gathering concerned does not unduly interfere with the rights of other people or lead to an obstruction of traffic, a breach of the peace or public disorder.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

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