DELICT https://old.zimlii.org/taxonomy/term/10329/all en Dharwizi Transport Services (Private) Limited v Muyambo (HH 38-19, HC4152/15) [2019] ZWHHC 39 (03 January 2019); https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/harare-high-court/2019/38 <div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>DHARWIZI TRANSPORT SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED</p> <p>versus</p> <p>MISHECK MAHLENGWE MUYAMBO</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</p> <p>MUSHORE J</p> <p>HARARE,18 June 2018, 30 January 2019</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>Civil Trial - Delict-breach of duties-loss occasioned</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><em>H. Mutasa</em>, for the plaintiff</p> <p><em>S. Simango</em>, for the defendant</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>            MUSHORE J: The plaintiff is Dharwizi Transport Services (Private) Limited; a private limited company which primarily deals in the business of conveyance and transportation of petroleum products, both inside and outside Zimbabwe. The defendant, one Misheck Mlambo was once employed by the plaintiff company as a truck driver and in such a capacity his duties were to transport fuel from one place to another.</p> <p>The facts were that on or about the 25th July 2013, the defendant was instructed by the plaintiff to transport 41,848 litres of petrol to Tazama in Ndola, Zambia from Beira, Mocambique. It is alleged by the plaintiff that defendant breached his duties in that he took possession of the fuel, but somehow diverted it to an unknown location, where he offloaded it and sold it for his own financial gain, causing a loss to the plaintiff in the amount of US$52,920-00. The US$52,920-00 is the value of the fuel consignment which the defendant was transporting on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed the current suit in a bid to recover US$52,920-00 from the defendant. Plaintiff is also claiming costs on a higher scale.</p> <p>Defendant filed a plea, denying plaintiff’s claim that he breached his duties as aforesaid, alleging that he fulfilled his duties by transporting the said fuel to the location instructed by the plaintiff. Defendant averred that when he returned to work after the trip that he furnished the plaintiff with proof of delivery by way of delivery notes. He stated that the plaintiff duly paid him his allowances upon receiving such delivery notes. He pleaded that the tracking report of his journey which was done by the plaintiff would confirm that he performed his duties, as and would show that he arrived at the destination and delivered the fuel as instructed by the plaintiff.</p> <p>Plaintiff countered this stating that the tracking report shows that he never arrived at the destination and that after the defendant returned from the journey in question and only that it was after the plaintiff had paid him his allowances, that the plaintiff was alerted by its client that the fuel in question had not yet arrived at Tazama depot.</p> <p>Plaintiff called four witnesses. The first witness was one Kelvin Masunzanwa. He testified that he had been employed by the plaintiff company since 2012 as a Security Manager. He testified that defendant was tasked to transport 41848 litres of petrol from Beira, Mocambique to the Tazama depot in Ndola, Zambia. He stated that on the 27th July 2013, the defendant travelled from Harare to Beira; arriving at Beira on the 2nd August 2013. He stated that the tracking report showed that defendant then passed through the Chirundu Border post between Zambia and Zimbabwe en route to presumably deliver the fuel to the Tazama Depot in Ndola, Zambia. He stated that after the defendant’s trip, when defendant returned to the depot in Harare, the defendant handed him documents represented them to be proof of delivery documents. On the basis of those documents being presented to him he paid the defendant his allowance and the defendant went on his way.  He stated that when he called the client in Zambia with respect to invoicing it, the Zambian client advised him that it was still waiting for delivery of the fuel in question. It was only then that alarm bells went off in his head causing him to begin investigations on the matter. He testified that upon a closer inspection of the documents submitted to him by the defendant, he ascertained that the documents were false. He produced the documents in court as follows:-</p> <ul> <li>A product receipt note number 30886 which was purportedly issued by the Zambian client Oper 8. Oper 8 denied that they issued that document to the defendant.</li> <li>A delivery note which had defendant had purportedly received at Tazama Depot in Zambia, which upon a closer inspection had some missing signatures which was unusual.</li> <li>A document numbered 001176 which is a document which defendant had represented was compiled by persons who received the fuel in Zambia.</li> </ul> <ul> <li>The document was incomplete in that it had no consignment number filled in; neither did it record the time when the cargo had been offloaded. Further the document showed an omission in that the product had not been quantified on delivery. The document was undated, and did not name the person who had purportedly received the fuel; who at the relevant time was a Mr Kazungo.</li> </ul> <p>(ii)  There was a variation in fuel quantity which was purportedly offloaded which was unexplained. The offloaded quantity of fuel was reflected as being 41 263 litres and yet the defendant was supposed to have delivered 41846 litres of fuel. When such a variation occurs ordinarily such a variation is recorded on that document as having occurred, with the customer commenting on such a variation on the document. This had not been done by the customer.</p> <p>Mr Masunzanwa stated that when he saw all of these discrepancies, he contacted the tracking company so that he could get a report on the route which the defendant had taken. A Mr Brian Chakara from the tracking company compiled a tracking report and the tracking report showed that the defendant never arrived at the intended destination being the Tazama depot.</p> <p>He stated that armed with all of this information, he telephoned the defendant to query the issue with him and that the defendant advised him that he was at Chirundu border post and that he was not feeling well. When he did not hear further from the defendant he said that he travelled to Chirundu in order to locate the defendant, only to find the truck which defendant was driving parked and abandoned by the defendant. He testified that he phoned the clinic at Chirundu looking for the defendant who had told him was unwell and that the defendant was nowhere to be found. A report was made to the Police and after several days he heard from the Police who stated that they had arrested defendant. Under cross examination, Mr Masunzanwa testified that he never should have paid the defendant any allowance, given that it was now clear to him that the defendant had not delivered the fuel in question to the plaintiff’s client in Tazama.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s second witness was one Bria Mukombo who was called by the plaintiff to give evidence about his purported signature on the delivery note which the defendant had presented on his return to Harare.  He testified that he was not at the Tazama depot at the relevant time and that on the dates that it was alleged by the defendant that he had personally taken delivery of the fuel consignment in Tazama, Ndola. Mr Mukombo testified that at the relevant time, he was actually employed by a company called Socotec International Inspection Zambia Limited as a fuel delivery inspector; based in Lusaka Zambia. He testified that he could never have signed the product receipt note number 30886 because he was not at Tazama depot in August 2013 when the purported delivery was made. Interestingly he also testified that the defendant could not have offloaded fuel at Tazama depot in August 2013 because at that time there was no petrol offloading. He informed the court that at the relevant time, petrol could only be offloaded at another depot called Indeni which was also located in Ndola, Zambia.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s third witness, one Mr Mhizhi Kazungo, who was employed as an Assistant Inspector at Tazama Petroleum Products Limited. Mr Kazungo also disowned the signature which was purportedly his on document 30886. He corroborated Mr Mukombo’s evidence that at the relevant time the Tazama depot was not receiving petrol consignments and thus the petrol which defendant alleged conveying could not have been offloaded at Tazama depot. He confirmed that Mr Mukombo was not working with him at the Kazamba depot at that time. Both Mr Mukombo and Mr Kazungo gave clear and direct evidence. They both had travelled from Zambia to give their evidence.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s fourth witness was the vehicle tracker, a Mr Brian Chakara who had been working for the tracking company called Treck-King Satellite Tracking and Recovery (Pvt) Ltd as a Systems Support Technician for 14 years. He explained in detail on how trucks and vehicles are tracked via satellite. During his testimony he produced the tracking report on defendant’s route which recorded the defendant’s route at the relevant time with pin-point precision. He demonstrated that the defendant’s truck never entered the Tazama depot as alleged by the defendant and that the tracking report showed that defendant’s vehicle had stopped on a street some blocks away; which was some considerable distance from the Tazama depot. He testified that on arrival at the street which was several blocks away from Tazama depot, the defendant had turned his engine off at 5:11pm and turned it on again at 6:09pm thereby illustrating that the defendant had stopped on the street from about an hour. He was even able to provide detail on when the trucks engine was switched on and off, and was also able to detail the specific times when the truck was idling or in motion. His tracking device also provided data on the speed that the defendant was travelling throughout his journey. After that he tracked the defendant leaving the street, turning round and retracing his journey on his way back away from Ndola to Zimbabwe. He stated that the defendant could never have offloaded fuel at Tazama because his truck never entered the Tazama depot. By the additional use of the Google Maps Application, he was able to approximate the distance between Tazama depot and the spot where the defendant had stopped for one hour. He approximated that that distance was approximately a kilometre away. He performed well on the stand and was an impressive witness.</p> <p>Defendant opened his case and testified as a sole witness for the defence. His testimony was poor, full of inconsistencies and frankly unbelievable. He testified that when he made the journey, he did not know where he was going and that he had to be guided by other truckers which he said he followed to Tazama depot. I found this to be implausible given that the defendant was a very experienced trucker. I also noted that this was a last minute defence, given that the defendant did not raise this point in his plea filed of record. During his testimony, the defendant began distancing himself from the documents produced by the plaintiff stating that the documents had been manufactured by the plaintiff. Again, that allegation was not contained in his plea. He told the court that he could not remember which documents he had signed, and then gave sensational testimony that he had fallen prey to fraudsters, yet at the same time he failed to justify why he took payment form his employer if the documents presented were indeed fraudulent. He accused the plaintiff’s witnesses of manufacturing the documents, including the tracking report. His testimony lacked credibility in its entirety and he struggled to answer questions which were put to him when he was being cross-examined. He was unable to explain his journey to the court and he did not challenge the evidence given by Mr Kazungo that there was no fuel offloading facility at Tazama at the relevant time.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s case was well presented and the witnesses performed very well as opposed to the defendant whose testimony was full of gaps. I am inclined to accept the testimony given by the plaintiff’s witnesses over that of the defendant.</p> <p>At the end of the trial the parties’ legal practitioners asked for time to prepare and file written submissions. I allowed the parties 10 days to file their closing submissions. Plaintiff complied. Defendant did not and to-date has not filed closing submissions.</p> <p>            The action for the recovery of the loss is an Aquilian action. The requirements are:-</p> <ul> <li>“There must have been some conduct on the defendant’s part (i.e. an act or omission) which the law of delict recognises as being wrongful or unlawful (the wrongfulness requirement);</li> <li>The conduct must have led either to physical harm to person or property and, thereby, to financial loss, or have caused purely financial loss which does not stem from any physical harm to person or property;</li> <li>The defendant must have inflicted the patrimonial loss intentionally or negligently;</li> <li>There must be a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the loss”</li> </ul> <p>G. Feltoe “<em>The Law of Delict’</em> [3rd Edition] page 9 </p> <p>The loss occasioned to the plaintiff was as a direct result of defendant’s wrongful conduct when defendant intentionally diverted his vehicle loaded with fuel and failed to deliver the consignment to the plaintiff’s customer. Although the defendant had been tasked with delivering the fuel to Tazama, he failed to do so as was explained by the plaintiff’s Mr Kazungo. In breach of his duty to the plaintiff, defendant offloaded the fuel to an unknown recipient and returned to Harare to collect allowances for a task which he had not performed. The plaintiff suffered financial loss of $52,920-00 as a result of the defendant’s actions. Plaintiff established this fact in testimony given by its four witnesses. Plaintiff is entitled to the remedy sought in this action.</p> <p>On the question of costs on a higher scale being sought by the plaintiff, I am not in a position to award special costs because plaintiff did not plead for them specifically in his declaration. An award for costs on a higher scale is one which has to specifically be pleaded to so that the other party can replicate to it, if necessary. It is not an award which is granted simply because a party desires it. Thus the plaintiff would only be entitled to an award of costs on the ordinary scale.</p> <p>            Accordingly I order as follows:-</p> <p>“1.       Defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of US$52,920-00 together with interest thereon at the prescribed rate, calculated from the date of this order to the date of payment in full.</p> <p>            2.         Defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>…………………, plaintiff’s legal practitioners</p> <p>……………….., defendant’s legal practitioners</p> <p> </p> </div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-download field-type-file field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Download:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="File" title="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document" src="/modules/file/icons/x-office-document.png" /> <a href="https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/files/harare-high-court/2019/38/2019-zwhhc-39.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=24741">2019-zwhhc-39.docx</a></span></div><div class="field-item odd"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="PDF icon" title="application/pdf" src="/modules/file/icons/application-pdf.png" /> <a href="https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/files/harare-high-court/2019/38/2019-zwhhc-39.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=175842">2019-zwhhc-39.pdf</a></span></div></div></div><span class="vocabulary field field-name-field-flynote-sync-local field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><h2 class="field-label">ZimLII Flynote:&nbsp;</h2><ul class="vocabulary-list"><li class="vocabulary-links field-item even"><a href="/tags-local/delict">DELICT</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item odd"><a href="/tags-local/employment">EMPLOYMENT</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item even"><a href="/tags-local/breach-confidence-servant">Breach of confidence by servant</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item odd"><a href="/tags-local/employee">Employee</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item even"><a href="/tags-local/misconduct-employee">misconduct of employee</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item odd"><a href="/tags-local/employer">Employer</a></li></ul></span> Wed, 30 Jan 2019 07:33:37 +0000 admin 9256 at https://old.zimlii.org Home Affairs Minister v Badenhorst (260/83, 117/83) [1983] ZWSC 117 (10 November 1983); https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/1983/117 <div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>REPORTABLE Z.L.R. ONLY (55)      </p> <p> </p> <p>Judgment No.S.C. 117/83</p> <p>Civil Appeal No . 260/83</p> <p>MINISTER OP HOME AFFAIRS v HENRY HERTZOG BADENHORST</p> <p>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE,</p> <p>GEORGES, CJ, BECK, JA &amp; GUBBAY, JA HARARE,</p> <p>OCTOBER 18 &amp; NOVEMBER 10, 1983.</p> <p> </p> <p>M.J. Gillespie, for the appellant</p> <p>J.B. Colegrave, for the respondent in forma pauperis</p> <p>GUBBAY JA: This is an appeal from     a decision of the High Court (MCNALLY J) upholding the contention of the respondent (the plaintiff) that s 76 of the Police Act (Cap 98) did not prescribe his cause of action against the appellant (the defendant).</p> <p> </p> <p>The cause of action arose in this way: The plaintiff was under arrest and in the custody of the Police in Bulawayo. On 13 November 1981 he was being driven in a Police motor vehicle from the Donnington Police Station to the Bulawayo Central Police. Station when the vehicle came into collision with a truck.</p> <p> </p> <p>The accident was entirely due to the negligence of the Police driver and resulted in the plaintiff sustaining an injury to the spine. These facts were common cause at the trial. It was also not disputed that in conveying the plaintiff to the Bulawayo Central Police Station, where he was required for questioning in connection with a crime under investigation, the Police driver was acting for the purposes of the detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders - duties imposed upon the Police Force by s 93(1) of the Constitution - and that he was obeying a lawful direction in respect of/</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>of the execution of his office given him by a superior officer.</p> <p>The plaintiff, however, delayed in instituting an action for damages against the State until a period well in excess of six months of the date of the accident had elapsed. He was thereupon met with the special defence that by virtue of s 76 of the Police Act the action was barred not only for a failure to commence it within six months but also on the ground that notice in writing had not been given as required.</p> <p>Section 76 reads</p> <p>"Any civil action instituted against the State or a member in respect of anything done or omit- ted be done under this Act shall be commenced within six months after the cause of action has arisen, and notice in writing of any civil action and the cause thereof shall be given to the defendant one month at least before the commencement of such action,"</p> <p>The phrase "anything done or omitted to be done under this Act" necessitates a referral to s 8, That section was repealed by Statutory Instrument 793 of 1979 together with ss 7 and 9, but one week later Statutory Instrument 813 of 1979 reinstated s 8 and repealed s 10 instead.</p> <p>Section 8(1) reads:-</p> <p>"Every Regular Force member shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as are by law conferred or imposed on a Regular Force member, and shall, subject to the provisions of such law, obey all lawful directions in respect of the execution of his office which he may from time to time receive,"                                                                   </p> <p>Mr Gillespie argued, both in the Court a quo and in this Court, that the effect of s 8(1) is to incorporate into the Police Act the provisions of all other/</p> <p>other enactments which give powers to the Police and define their duties - in particular s 93(1) of the Constitution and Parts V and VI of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (Cap 59). It imposes upon every member of the Force the obligation to perform the duties as are by law imposed. Any such duty, when performed, meets the requirement of s 8(1) and constitutes something done "under this Act". Consequently, as the Police officer in transporting the plaintiff to the Bulawayo Central Police Station was performing an action bound up with and incidental to the duty imposed upon him by s 93(1) of the Constitution, that of investigating crime, and was in addition obeying a lawful direction in respect of the execution of his office, the action instituted against his employer, the State, is in respect of something done under the Police Act,</p> <p>The learned judge rejected this argument.</p> <p>He held that s 8(1) is concerned not with the</p> <p>definition of the member’s powers or duties but</p> <p>merely with his obligation to exercise such powers</p> <p>and perform such duties, and that what the powers and</p> <p>duties are is immaterial. He reasoned therefrom that the</p> <p>protection afforded by s 76 only applies to something</p> <p>done or omittted to be done under the Police Act.</p> <p>alone - for instance where the State is sued</p> <p>because a Police officer is alleged to have acted</p> <p>wrongfully under s 8(2). But where the State is sued</p> <p>for something done or ommited to be done by a Police officer</p> <p>under the Criminal Code or the Constitution the</p> <p>protection is not available to it. In other words, the</p> <p>phrase "under this Act" means under the Police Act</p> <p>and cannot be extended to include what was done under</p> <p>the Constitution, the Criminal Code or any other statute.</p> <p><a name="bookmark2" id="bookmark2">The further view was expressed that the plaintiff was</a></p> <p>injured/</p> <p> </p> <p>injured not because the member of the Police Force was obeying a lawful order but because he had driven negligently and a negligent act is not something done under the Act.</p> <p>The Police Act did not give the member any authority to be negligent.</p> <p>In support of his argument Mr Gillespie cited a passage from the judgment of GREENBERG J (as he then was) in Thorne v Union Government 1929 TPD 156. In that case the court was concerned with whether an action for damages resulting from the negligent driving by a policeman of a mule drawn trolley was prescribed by s 30 of the Police Act, No 14 of 1912. The section, where relevant, read:-</p> <p>"For the protection of persons acting in the execution of this Act every civil action against any person in respect of anything done in pursuance of this Act or the regulations, shall be commenced within ... . "</p> <p>The learned judge looked to s 7(1) of the Act to ascertain what were the powers and duties of the members of the Police Force and said this at 158:—</p> <p>"Section 7 of the Act deals with the powers and duties of members of the police force, and any­thing falling within these powers and duties would be done in pursuance of the Act or the regulations.</p> <p>The powers and duties referred to in s 7 are those contained in the Act and in any other law. Thus Act 31 of 1917? (the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act) ss 25 to 27, 41 to 45, 49. to 52, 54, 332, 381 (3), and Act 32 of 1917, (the Magistrates Court Act) s 14, and Order 2, rule 3, confer powers or impose duties on members of the police force."</p> <p>Clearly s 7(1) equates materially in its language to s 8(1) of Chapter 98, Nor do I consider that the words "in pursuance of this Act" in s 30 connote a meaning different from/</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>from "under this Act" in its counterpart, s 76. In the context of their sections both phrases are synonymous and mean "in conformity with" or "in terms of".</p> <p> </p> <p>It is my view therefore that the dictum in Thorne's case, supra, coming as it does from so eminent a judge, is a most persuasive pointer in favour of the defendant's contention. Moreover its correctness has never been doubted, It was approved by MALAN J in E. Rosenberg (Pty.) Ltd. v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1945 TPD 225 at 228, and twenty years later was re-stated by CLAYLEN J in Khoza v Minister of Justice 1965 (4) SA 286 (W) at 292B, in these words:-</p> <p>"... it can only be that a thing is done in pursuance of that Act if the Act itself or some other enactment lays down that thing as a function of the police constable." (the emphasis is mine).</p> <p> </p> <p>The cases of Thorne and Rosenberg, supra, are</p> <p>distinguishable from the present in that on the facts it</p> <p> </p> <p>was thereheld that the respective activities of the policemen, in driving the mule-drawn trolley and in going on patrol, at the time when they committed the acts complained of were not being conducted pursuant to the Police Act or any other law. It therefore followed that the acts of negligence done in, the process or driving the trolley and patrolling could not be "anything done in pursuance of this Act". The position changes, however, once there is a course of conduct admittedly under the Act and while following that course an unlawful act is committed.</p> <p>The facts in Hattingh v Hlabaki 1926 CPD 220 are apposite and the judgment instructive. The plaintiff Claimed/</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>claimed damages in the magistrate’s court for malicious arrest and assault against three Police constables who had arrested him upon a charge under the Stock Theft Act, The defendants objected that the plaintiff had given no notice of the intended action nor had the action been commenced within four months as required by s 30 of' the Police Act. The magistrate dismissed the objection.</p> <p>An appeal against that order was allowed. BENJAMIN J (with whom LOUWRENS J concurred) said at 222-223:-</p> <p>"Now, I have already read s 30 of the Act, which affords this protection to police constables when doing anything in pursuance of the Act. In order to ascertain what may be done in pursuance of this Act, one has to turn back to s 7(1), which says ...</p> <p>Now, it is clear from the pleadings and from the evidence, that the three defendants were acting as police constables, and that they were acting in pursuance of lawful instructions given by a superior officer. They were instructed to go out and make investigations in connection with stock thefts, and, in pursuance of this duty, they arrested the plaintiff. They were in plain clothes at the time they arrested the plaintiff, and they were without a warrant.</p> <p>They were justified in arresting him without a warrant while in plain clothes by reason of the provision of the Stock Theft Act (s 6(1), Act No 26 of 1923).</p> <p>It is true that in arresting the plaintiff in this way, they were acting by virtue of the powers conferred upon them by this particular section of the Stock Theft Act, but, nevertheless, they were also acting under and by virtue of the provisions of s 7(1) of the Act of 1912. They were carrying out lawful instructions given to them by a superior officer, and therefore, if in committing the alleged assault upon the plaintiff, they were acting in pursuance of the arrest, then I think clearly they fell under s 30 of the Act of 1912, and were entitled to enjoy all the benefits conferred by that section, and that any proceedings intended should have been brought within the period prescribed and after due notice has been given."</p> <p>But the force of these authorities apart, the interpretation adopted by the learned judge  in the court below leads to the startling/</p> <p> </p> <p>/</p> <p>8.              S.C. 117/83</p> <p>startling consequence that the only actions falling within the protection of s 76 are essentially those dealt with under ss 8(2) and (3) of the Act; litigation in respect of which is not readily conceivable. I can discern no apparent reason for so restricted a limitation of actions.</p> <p>It could hardly have been the intention of the lawmaker to afford the State or a member of the Police Force protection only in respect of the comparatively trivial powers and duties specified in ss 8(2) and (3). To the contrary, it seems to me that the intention in enacting s 76 was to impose an effective limitation of actions brought against the State in respect of anything done in the exercise of powers or duties proper to the Police Force. It would be unreasonable in the extreme to expect a member of the Police Force to answer a cause of action alleged to arise, for instance, from the execution of his power of arrest or search if there were no limit of time in which such actions were to be brought. I respectfully endorse the' observations of BENJAMIN J in Hattingh v Hlabaki, supra, at 223E that:-</p> <p> </p> <p>"A police constable may have to deal with a great number of cases, the details of which would probably be evanescent, and if a plaintiff was not under an obligation, to bring an action within a period, recollec- tion of the proceedings would probably vanish from the mind, or become obscure; therefore, these provisions of s 30 seem to be only reasonable.”</p> <p>Mr Colegrave , who appeared for the plaintiff, was constrained to concede that prior to the repeal of 3 7 of the Act the plaintiff's cause of action would have been prescribed under s 76. He sought to argue, however, that by its repeal the carpet had been pulled from underneath s 76. With this submission I cannot agree.</p> <p>The repeal was effected because the Constitution of Zimbabwe/</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>Zimbabwe Rhodesia (Act No 12 of 1979) contained a similar provision in s 98(1) (now s 93(1) of the present Constitution). It was therefore unnecessary to have the general duties of the Police Force repeated in two enactments. But it is more than probable that the Legislature considered that notwithstanding the excision of s 7 from the Act, the ambit of s 8(1) remained sufficie- ntly wide to afford the State or a member the protection hitherto enjoyed. Certainly it is not unfair to suppose that the extent of the protection held to obtain under the former South African Police Act of 1912, which had no  equivalent provision to s 7, was known and appreciated.  It is inconceivable therefore that the intention was to emasculate an existing and necessary protection.</p> <p>                                           </p> <p>Mr Colegrave, quite correctly in my opinion, did not rely on the alternative approach of the learned judge that because the Police officer had driven negligently he could not have been performing a duty under the Act.</p> <p>The theory that a servant acting in the course of his employment has no authority to act negligently or improperly was exploded very many years ago. The mere fact that the act complained of was wrongful does not in itself denote that it was not pursuant to the performance of a legal duty. The plaintiff cannot say in one breath that the State is liable because the Police officer drove the motor vehicle in the course of his employment and in the next the opposite, that the Police officer could not have been acting under the Act because the Act gives him no authority to perform his duties negligently or improperly. See Woodiwiss v Union Government 1937 NPD 101 at 104. It is only the negligent or improper performance of a duty which will give rise to a cause of action to which s 76 applies, for if that provision were confined regular or lawful actions there would be no need for it. It is obvious that where anybody does a lawful act</p> <p><a name="bookmark1" id="bookmark1">under/</a></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>under the Act .he needs no protection and no action lies against him whether brought within six months or not.</p> <p>See Dineka and Anor v Van Der Merwe and Ors 1962 (3) SA 220 (T) at 223A-B.</p> <p>Finally the Australian case of Board of Fire Commissioners (N.S.W.) v Ardouin (1963—1964) 109 CLR 105, referred to by Mr Colegrave, does not seem to me to be in point, The section of the Act there considered did not fall to be interpreted in the light of any provision similar to s 8(1) of the Police Act,</p> <p>In the result I am satisfied that the view of the learned judge a quor that the delict of the Police officer did not enjoy the protection and benefit of s 76 of the Police Act, was ill-founded.</p> <p>There remains the question of costs. Although there is no principle which precludes a court from awarding costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff who has sued in forma pauperis, the grant of such an order is not usual. This is especially so where, as is the case here, the particular proceeding was not vexatious and the conduct of the pauper in no way improper. A further relevant factor is that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the admitted negligence of the Police and only failed to recover compensation because of a procedural bar. Taking account of these matters, I do not consider it appropriate to saddle the plaintiff with the defendant’s costs.</p> <p>The appeal will be allowed and the judgment altered to read: "The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.</p> <p>GEORGES CJ:   I agree.</p> <p> </p> <p>BECK JA: I agree.</p> <p> </p> <p>Civil Division of the Attorney-General Office, legal practitioners for the appellant.</p> <p>Coghlan, Welsh &amp; Guest, legal practitioners for the respondent.</p> </div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-download field-type-file field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Download:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="File" title="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document" src="/modules/file/icons/x-office-document.png" /> <a href="https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/files/supreme-court-zimbabwe/1983/117/1983-zwsc-117.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=42250">1983-zwsc-117.docx</a></span></div><div class="field-item odd"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="PDF icon" title="application/pdf" src="/modules/file/icons/application-pdf.png" /> <a href="https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/files/supreme-court-zimbabwe/1983/117/1983-zwsc-117.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=235669">1983-zwsc-117.pdf</a></span></div></div></div><span class="vocabulary field field-name-field-flynote-sync-local field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><h2 class="field-label">ZimLII Flynote:&nbsp;</h2><ul class="vocabulary-list"><li class="vocabulary-links field-item even"><a href="/tags-local/appeal">Appeal</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item odd"><a href="/tags-local/delict">DELICT</a></li></ul></span> Fri, 16 Nov 2018 10:16:47 +0000 admin 9148 at https://old.zimlii.org Ndangariro v Tayali & Another (HB 99-18, HC 100/18) [2018] ZWBHC 99 (26 April 2018); https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/bulawayo-high-court/2018/99 <div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p><strong>LLOYD GARIKAYI NDANGARIRO</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>Versus</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>JOSEPH BAKURU TAYALI</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>And</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>TONGAI KAMUTINGONDO</strong></p> <p> </p> <p>IN THE HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</p> <p>MAKONESE J</p> <p>BULAWAYO 20 &amp; 22 FEBRUARY &amp; 26 APRIL 2018</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>Civil Trial</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><em>Ms Mutshina</em> for the plaintiff</p> <p><em>M. Ncube</em> for the 1st defendant</p> <p><em>M. T. T. Chitere</em> for the 2nd defendant</p> <p>            <strong>MAKONESE J:        </strong>Where a litigant is suing for payment of damages based on wrongfulness, such damages are not just there for the taking but must be proved on a balance of probabilities.  The cause of action based on <em>actio injuriarum</em> requires proof based on wrongful intentional impairment of the person, dignity or reputation of the plaintiff by the defendant.  To succeed in such a claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove impairment of the relevant aspect of the personality relied upon.  The plaintiff must allege facts, which objectively speaking are sufficient to lead to a reasonable inference of wrongfulness.</p> <p>            In this matter plaintiff issued summons seeking against the defendants, jointly and severally payment of a total sum of US$32 000, broken down as follows:</p> <ul> <li>the sum of US$12 000 being cash unlawfully seized from the plaintiff by the defendants.</li> <li>the sum of $10 000 being damages for impairment of dignity</li> <li>payment of the sum of US10 000 being damages for unlawful arrest and detention.</li> </ul> <p>The nub of the plaintiff’s case is that he is a senior police officer in the Zimbabwe Republic Police holding the rank of Chief Inspector.  Plaintiff has been in the service of the police force for twenty years.  Plaintiff alleges that on the 28th August 2012 he was arrested by 2nd defendant who at the material time was a junior   police  officer  holding the rank of Assistant Inspector.  Plaintiff contends that his arrest was at the instigation of 1st defendant following a dispute over certain mining claims in the Shangani area.  The plaintiff further contends that he was ordered to surrender all the money he had, and that a total of US$12 000 in cash was taken from him unlawfully, against his will.  In addition, as a result of his arrest by a junior officer, 2nd defendant, who was acting in connivance with the 1st defendant, plaintiff’s dignity was impaired and he suffered damages in the sum of US$10 000.</p> <p>The defendants disputed the plaintiff’s claims.  1st defendant indicated that following theft of gold nuggets at his mine on the night of 28 August 2012 he prevailed upon the plaintiff to attend at the CID offices at Development House, Gweru to explain himself.  1st defendant averred that plaintiff freely attended at CID offices and confessed to having extracted 2kgs of gold nuggets from his claims.  Plaintiff duly apologised and offered to repay the value of the gold.  Plaintiff then immediately handed a sum of US$4 000 which he had on his person.  Later that same night plaintiff collected a further sum of US$8 000  from his house which he handed to the plaintiff.  2nd defendant averred that he did not effect any arrest on the plaintiff and that the money paid to 1st defendant was not forcibly taken from the plaintiff.  The defendants aver that the plaintiff’s claims for damages are without any foundation.</p> <p><strong>Plaintiff’s case</strong></p> <p>            Plaintiff testified in this matter and confirmed that he is a senior member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police holding the position of Chief Inspector.  At the time the matter arose, he held the same position.  Plaintiff stated that he was walking along 6th Street in Gweru on the 28th August 2012 at around 7pm.  As he approached Automobile Assocition Offices, he was  in the company of his son, when he was approached by a white ZANU (PF) double cab motor vehicle.  2nd defendant disembarked from the car and indicated that he was under arrest.  He was informed that the issue involved theft of gold nuggets and that a report had been made by 1st defendant.  Plaintiff stated that he was driven to CID offices where he was wrongfully and unlawfully detained from about 7pm to about 10pm without any justification or reasonable cause.  Plaintiff testified that he was subsequently made to surrender the money that he had on his person totaling US$4 000.  He was taken to his Mkoba residence in Gweru where a further sum of US$8 000 was taken from him.  Plaintiff stated that he did not surrender the money voluntarily but was threatened with arrest and detention.  The plaintiff confirmed that he was released at Chicken Inn in Gweru around 10pm that same night.  He did not make a report of his alleged unlawful arrest and detention immediately after his release.</p> <p>            On being cross-examined, the plaintiff was unable to satisfactorily explain how that 2nd defendant was able to locate him at a specific point in Gweru that evening.  It  became  apparent that there must have been some communication between plaintiff and 2nd defendant prior to the meeting.  The probabilities favour the view that indeed 2nd defendant and plaintiff did communicate that evening about plaintiff’s precise location. The probabilities also favour the view that 2nd defendant having located the plaintiff must have discussed his reasons for seeking him out, as plaintiff was his superior.  It is logical that the 2nd defendant would have invited the plaintiff to discuss the matter at CID offices.  The plaintiff must have gone on his own volition to meet the 1st defendant who was the complainant in the theft of gold.  It is improbable that the plaintiff who held a high ranking position in the police force would have failed to protest against and unlawful arrest.  The probabilities also favour the conclusion that plaintiff and 1st defendant discussed the theft of gold and that a settlement was reached at CID offices where plaintiff was to repay the value of the gold.  After gaining his “freedom” at around 10pm on the night of 28th August 2012 Plaintiff nothing about the alleged unlawful dispossession of his money amounting to US$12 000.  Plaintiff admitted that he took no action for a period of five months from the date of the unlawful arrest.  He did not take action that same night so that the “criminals” could be accounted for whilst they still had the money.  This is what a reasonable man in plaintiff’s shoes should or ought to have done.  The plaintiff’s conduct is not consistent with the conduct of a wronged senior police officer.  No explanation is given why he did not file criminal charges.</p> <p>            Whilst plaintiff painstakingly tried to dramatize the manner of his “arrest”, the evidence from his son <strong>Joseph Ndangariro</strong> indicated that 2nd defendant was respectful of the plaintiff as he referred to him as “Boss”, in his conversation with the plaintiff.  There was no evidence placed before the court indicating that plaintiff was mishandled or treated in any humiliating manner on the night in question.  The plaintiff was aware of the arresting procedures and ought to have complained about the 2nd defendant’s conduct there and then.  Plaintiff’s evidence on how he parted with a substantial sum of money is not convincing. He was not searched.  He admitted that he handed over the money on his person amounting to US$4 000 at the CID offices.  Plaintiff did not explain how the defendants would have known that he had a further sum of US$8 000 at his Mkoba residence.  The plaintiff’s conduct leads to the irresistible conclusion that plaintiff knew that he had illicitly obtained the money from the sale of gold nuggets he had extracted at Shangani the previous night.</p> <p>            It is important to note that plaintiff conceded under cross examination that he had not carried out any mining activities at all at his own New Eclipse 8 claim.  The question that arises is that if he did not mine there where did he get the gold nuggets and what was he doing at the Shangani Farm?</p> <p><strong>Defendant’s case</strong></p> <p>            Both defendants denied that the plaintiff was ever placed under arrest.  1st  defendant testified that he was contacted by one of his guards at his mine in Shangani on the night of 27th August 2012.  He was alerted to the fact that plaintiff and some other persons had invaded his mining claims at New Eclipse 7 mining claims.  1st defendant produced documents to show that he was authorized to prospect at his mining claims.  This position was confirmed by the Mining Commissioner.  The 1st defendant’s guard was also called to testify.  He corroborated 1st defendant’s assertions that the plaintiff had arrived at Eclipse 7 mine in the dead of the night. He was glad in police uniform. He was carrying a pistol.  He ordered all the guards to switch off their mobile phones.  The guards were ordered to assist in the extraction of gold nuggets.  After taking off with the gold, the guard called 1st defendant in the early hours of the 27th August 2012.  1st defendant indicated he would attend to the matter the following morning.  The 1st defendant confirmed that on the 28th August 2012 he had met the plaintiff at CID offices at Gweru around 7pm.  He stated that he asked the police officers to leave him in an office with the plaintiff so that the two would discuss in private.  The plaintiff admitted that he had extracted 2kgs worth of gold.  The plaintiff proposed to give 1st defendant the money that was on his person in the sum of US$4 000.  The plaintiff then drove to Mkoba in Gweru where he collected a further sum of US$8 000.  The 1st defendant accepted the US$12 000.  The plaintiff then left the CID offices and they parted company around 10pm at Chicken Inn.  1st defendant was shocked when some months later plaintiff filed charges for extortion against him and 2nd defendant.  These allegations were however dismissed by the court for lack of evidence.</p> <p>            For his part, 2nd defendant, <strong>Tongai Kamutingondo</strong>, expressed his dismay at the plaintiff’s claims.  He indicated that his role in the matter was simply to facilitate the meeting between plaintiff and 1st defendant.  He denied that the plaintiff was arrested or detained as alleged.  2nd defendant explained that when he received the complaint of theft of gold he called the plaintiff on his mobile phone. Plaintiff informed him that he was walking along 6th Street.  After obtaining the plaintiff’s location, defendant proceeded to meet the plaintiff near the AA offices along 6th Street, Gweru.  2nd defendant used the ZANU (PF) double cab motor vehicle because he had no other means of transport at that time.  It is a notorious fact that several police stations in the country do not have sufficient resources, especially motor vehicles.  2nd defendant indicated that 1st defendant and the plaintiff elected to be left alone to discuss the matter in private.  2nd defendant was not involved in the payment of the US$12 000 to the 1st defendant.  He indicated though, that the suggestion that he was given a sum of US$200 from the amount handed to 1st defendant was false.</p> <p><strong>Analysis of the evidence</strong></p> <p>            From the evidence adduced in court the following factors are common cause:</p> <ul> <li>Plaintiff was in the company of his son Joseph Ndangariro along 6th Street Gweru on the 28th August 2012 around 7pm</li> <li>Plaintiff was approached by the 2nd defendant who indicated that there was a complaint against him in connection with a complaint of theft of gold nuggets filed against him by the 1st defendant.</li> <li>Plaintiff was invited to CID offices at Development House in Gweru for discussions with 1st defendant</li> <li>Plaintiff agreed to meet 1st defendant and was driven to CID offices</li> <li>Following discussions between plaintiff and first defendant, in private, plaintiff surrendered cash amounting to US$4 000 to 1st defendant before proceedings to Mkoba in Gweru to collect a further sum of US$8 000.</li> <li>Plaintiff was not searched before he surrendered the money.</li> <li>Plaintiff was not placed under arrest and no statement was recorded from him</li> <li>Plaintiff pressed charges of extortion against the defendants some five months later.</li> <li>Plaintiff did not protest about the alleged unlawful arrest at the nearest police station and did not indicate that money had been taken from him without his express consent.</li> </ul> <p>The evidence in this matter indicates that there was a gold rush at a farm in Shangani on the 27th August 2012.  Hordes of gold panners invaded the 1st defendant’s Eclipse 7 Mine in Shangani before they were dispersed by the police.  The plaintiff who held a senior rank of Chief Inspector later came at night brandishing a pistol.  He ordered the guards to collect gold nuggets.  After taking off with the loot one of the guards called the 1st defendant and alerted him of the occurrence.  The following day plaintiff was invited to CID offices in Gweru to explain his involvement in the theft of gold from 1st defendant’s claims.  The evidence indicates that some  form of  settlement was reached.  Plaintiff agreed to pay the 1st defendant the value of the gold.  It would seem that plaintiff was content to part with all the money he had in cash amounting o US$12 000 just to resolve the case.  The evidence led clearly does not show that plaintiff was arrested or detained as alleged in the particulars of claim.</p> <p><strong>The applicable law</strong></p> <p>            The issues for determination are as follows:</p> <ul> <li>whether the defendants are liable to pay the sum of US$12 000 being cash recovered from the plaintiff and was unlawfully seized by the defendants</li> <li>whether or not the defendants are liable to pay plaintiff the sum of US$10 000 as damages for impairment of damages</li> <li>whether or not the defendants are liable to pay plaintiff the sum of US$10 00 as damages for unlawful arrest and detention.</li> </ul> <p>On the first issue of the alleged unlawful seizure of the money there was simply no evidence to show that the money was not handed to the 1st defendant voluntarily.  For a party to succeed in proving its case in a civil suit it must prove its claims on a balance of probabilities.  In Zeffert and Paizes, <em>The Essential Evidence</em>, at page 37, the authors state that:</p> <p>“A defendant’s failure to give evidence cannot justify a verdict for the plaintiff unless there is enough evidence taking into account the absence to enable the conclusion that his version is more probable than not, that is to say, conclude by balancing of probabilities, that among several conclusions it is the most credible, suitable and acceptable.”</p> <p>            This case in my view clearly shows that plaintiff failed to prove that on a balance of probabilities that his version could be believed.  The plaintiff carried the onus to prove that the money was taken from him unlawfully.  He failed to discharge that onus.</p> <p>            On the question of damages arising from impairment of dignity plaintiff testified that he felt belittled as 2nd defendant was his subordinate.  His status was lowered, moreso,  in the presence of his son.  To succeed in such a claim the plaintiff must allege facts, which objectively speaking are sufficient to lead  to a reasonable inference of wrongfulness.  It is not sufficient to merely allege that such an act is wrong.  See <em>C F Allie</em> v <em>Foodworld Stores Distribution Centre (Pvt) Ltd</em> (2004) ALL SA 369.</p> <p>            By alleging that he was entitled to payment in the sum of US$10 000 for impairment of his dignity, the plaintiff ought to have shown how his dignity was impaired.  He may have felt that a junior officer should not have been involved in requiring him to answer questions relating to the complaint of theft of gold.  Indeed the plaintiff may have felt somewhat “belittled”, but that does not prove wrongfulness.  No delictual liability can be established by merely alleging it.  In any event the plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to prove the damages he allegedly suffered.  A party who sues for damages must observe that damages are not there for the taking.  One cannot pluck a figure from the air and peg an amount of damages he feels he ought to be awarded.  A party seeking delictual damages must prove such damages.  The plaintiff failed to prove that he is entitled to any damages for impairment of dignity in the sum claimed or any lessor amount.</p> <p>            The plaintiff alleged that he was unlawfully arrested and detained.  For that he sought damages in the sum of US$10 000.  Under our law, the delict of unlawful arrest and detention is committed when a person without lawful authority or justification, restrains the liberty of another by arresting or imprisoning him.  <em>Animis injuriandi</em> will be presumed in that the plaintiff need only prove that the arrest or imprisonment was illegal and not that there was intention to act illegally or to cause harm.  See G. Feltoe – <em>A Guide to the Zimbabwean Law of Delict</em> (2ed page 48).</p> <p>            See also <em>Muyambo</em> v <em>Ngomaikarira &amp; Others</em> 2011 (2) ZLR ST (H), where the court held that the delict of unlawful arrest is committed when the defendant without justification restrains the liberty of another.  If the arrest is legal this action cannot be brought.  In <em>Masawi</em> v <em>Chabata and Anor</em> 1991 (1) ZLR 148 (H), GREENLAND J remarked that:</p> <p><em>“The police were faced with a potentially explosive situation and it was proper to assume such measures to diffuse the situation including inviting all parties involved to neutral grounds of a police station where a proper resolution of the dispute would take place.”</em></p> <p>            In the present matter the 2nd defendant invited the plaintiff to the police station to discuss the complaint regarding the theft of gold nuggets.  The conduct of the plaintiff did not indicate that he was placed under arrest and the he was arrested.  Even if one were to take the view that the plaintiff was indeed placed under arrest, such an arrest was not proved to be unlawful.  As I have indicated before the plaintiff was a senior police officer who could have immediately asserted his rights by protesting against any unlawful conduct.  The plaintiff was aware that there were serious allegations of theft of nuggets that were being levelled against him.  One would assume that by discussing the issue in the privacy of the CID offices was the appropriate manner to handle the situation. The Plaintiff appears to have agreed to have the matter resolved amicably. There is no evidence of any undue pressure being brought to bear upon the Plaintiff.</p> <p><strong>Disposition</strong></p> <p>            Iam satisfied that the plaintiff failed to prove his claim for damages.  He failed to prove that the money recovered from him was taken unlawfully.  The plaintiff was required to adduce evidence on a balance of probabilities to sustain is claims as particularized in the particulars of claim.  As regards costs, the defendants aver that the plaintiff is a dishonest litigant.  Throughout his trial, the defendants contend that plaintiff was probating and reprobating.  To some degree the conduct of the plaintiff in this matter leaves a lot to be desired.  I have no doubt that from the evidence adduced in court there was ample proof that plaintiff abused his powers.  He travelled  all the way from Gweru to Shangani at night and extracted gold from 1st defendant’s mining  claims.  The plaintiff ordered the guards at the mining site to help extract the gold.  Throughout the operation he was clad in a police uniform.  Such  conduct ought to be condemned.  This claim for damages should not have been brought up in the first place.  I do not believe, however, that the costs against the plaintiff should be on a punitive scale.  It is my view that the following is an appropriate order;</p> <p>            The plaintiff’s claims against the defendants are hereby dismissed with costs.</p> <p><em>Messrs T. Hara &amp; Partners</em>, applicant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Messrs Phulu &amp; Ncube,</em> 1st defendant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Chitere Chidawanyika &amp; Partners</em>, 2nd defendant’s legal practitioners</p> <p> </p> </div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-download field-type-file field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Download:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="File" title="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document" src="/modules/file/icons/x-office-document.png" /> <a href="https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/files/bulawayo-high-court/2018/99/2018-zwbhc-99.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=27170">2018-zwbhc-99.docx</a></span></div><div class="field-item odd"><span class="file"><img class="file-icon" alt="PDF icon" title="application/pdf" src="/modules/file/icons/application-pdf.png" /> <a href="https://old.zimlii.org/zw/judgment/files/bulawayo-high-court/2018/99/2018-zwbhc-99.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=195751">2018-zwbhc-99.pdf</a></span></div></div></div><span class="vocabulary field field-name-field-flynote-sync-local field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><h2 class="field-label">ZimLII Flynote:&nbsp;</h2><ul class="vocabulary-list"><li class="vocabulary-links field-item even"><a href="/tags-local/damages">DAMAGES</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item odd"><a href="/tags-local/delictual-damages">Delictual (DAMAGES)</a></li><li class="vocabulary-links field-item even"><a href="/tags-local/delict">DELICT</a></li></ul></span> Fri, 08 Jun 2018 07:17:29 +0000 admin 8889 at https://old.zimlii.org