REPORTABLE
(27)
Judgment No.
S.C. 34/02
Civil
Appeal No. 225/01
GEDDES
LIMITED v MARK TAWONEZVI
SUPREME
COURT OF ZIMBABWE
EBRAHIM
JA, SANDURA JA & MALABA JA
HARARE,
JANUARY 10 & MAY 27, 2002
A
G Matika,
for the appellant
The
respondent in person
MALABA JA:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court delivered on
24 July 2001 granting the respondent
the following order:
1. THAT
misconduct proceedings instituted against the applicant, together
with his suspension, preferment of misconduct charges, determination
of these charges and meting (out) of penalty be set aside as null and
void.
2. THAT
the respondent pay to the applicant the salary and other benefits due
to him from the date of his suspension, being 10 August
1998,
minus whatever sum he is proved to owe the respondent and any
deductions required by law.
3. THAT
the respondent shall pay the costs of this application.
The
historical events forming the background to the case are these -
The
respondent was employed by the appellant. Their relationship as
employer and employee was governed in matters of discipline
by a
registered Code of Conduct for the Commercial Sector (the Code).
The Code defined the acts of misconduct and prescribed
the
disciplinary procedure to be followed should an employee be accused
of committing misconduct. It also specified the person
to
investigate the allegations, prefer charges and conduct disciplinary
hearings. The disciplinary action to be taken in the event
of an
employee being found guilty of misconduct was also specified.
In clause 3.3
of the Code it was provided that:
the
employer, after consultation with the Works Council, shall
appoint in writing one
or more persons in his employment to be the Designated Officer
for the purpose of administering this Code. (the underlining
is
for emphasis)
Clause 4
provided that where it appeared to a designated officer that an
employee had committed an offence he had to investigate
the
circumstances of the alleged commission of the offence forthwith.
He was obliged to:
4.1 Notify the employee, in
writing, of the nature of the alleged offence and of the impending
investigations;
4.2 In the
event of an offence warranting dismissal in terms of Part IV,
SUSPEND the employee with or without pay as the officer
shall
stipulate, pending his decision on the matter in terms of
paragraph 5.2;
4.3 Gather and
record all evidence to the alleged misconduct;
4.4 Afford the
employee the chance of presenting his or her case either personally
or by a chosen representative, and of calling witnesses
in his
defence, the employer shall release such witnesses to enable them to
attend the hearing for the purpose of giving evidence;
4.5 Conduct
his investigation in accordance with the principles of natural
justice;
4.6 Prepare a
comprehensive summary of his investigation, including such summary of
any decision made and action taken in terms of
paragraph 5; and
4.7 Give a
decision within fourteen (14) days of receipt of such case.
Paragraph 5.2
provided that if, after having conducted the investigation, the
designated officer was satisfied that the employee
had committed an
offence for which the appropriate penalty was dismissal, he had to
submit all the evidence, in whatever form, assembled
by him together
with the summary referred to in para 4.6 to the employer for his
decision.
On receipt
of the evidence the employer was obliged under clause 6.1 to
examine such evidence in detail. The employer had
the discretion to
take such further evidence in whatever form he considered
appropriate. If he decided to call for further evidence
the
employer was obliged to afford the employee the opportunity of
appearing before him. If the employer was satisfied that the
employee was guilty of an offence he could impose the appropriate
penalty in relation to that offence as set out in Part IV
of the
Code. If the penalty was dismissal, the employer was obliged to
advise the employee in writing indicating the date of termination
of
employment and of the employees right to appeal.
It so
happened that on 10 June 1998 an order was purportedly made by
Lesel Cosmetics to the appellant to supply goods
valued at
$16 427.43. An invoice, No. 221144, was raised in respect
of the order and its details recorded in the computer.
Although the
goods were dispatched they were never delivered to Lesel Cosmetics.
It was discovered, upon investigation,
that there was no record of
the order in the computer. The respondents password had been
used, the same day, to delete all information
relating to the order.
As a result of the fraud the appellant lost goods valued at
$16 427.43.
On 19 August
1998 Mrs G K Madyara, who was the operations director,
wrote the respondent a letter of suspension
in these terms:
RE:
BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT; DISHONESTY AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES;
EMPLOYMENT CODE OF CONDUCT AND GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE FOR THE COMMERCIAL
SECTOR, GROUP IV OFFENCES
On the
10/6/98 an order for Lesel Cosmetics was generated, shipped and
dispatched. Later on the same day your password was
used to delete
all the quantities on invoice 221144 so that the computer record
would show that nothing went out on that invoice.
Unfortunately
that order was not delivered to Lesel and the company lost goods
worth $16 427.43.
As
a result you are hereby suspended without pay from the 10th August
1998.
The letter did
not charge the respondent with any particular offence. It was not
alleged in the letter that the respondent personally
used his
password to delete the information relating to the order from the
computer or that he permitted another person to use his
password to
delete the information with the intention of causing prejudice to the
appellant. Mrs Madyara signed off as a Designated
Officer.
On 19 August
1998 Mrs Madyara wrote to the respondent, requesting him to
attend a disciplinary hearing on 25 August
1998. Present at
the hearing was Mrs Madyara, Mr J Chifokoyo, the
appellants human resources manager, his assistant
and the
respondent. No record of the proceedings was produced.
The
respondent disclosed in the founding affidavit that it was alleged at
the hearing that he had deleted the information from the
computer
because his password was used. He said he vehemently denied the
allegation. It was his uncontradicted averment that
Mrs Madyara
admitted at the hearing that she had at the time authorised one
H Mundwa to use his password. He said Mrs Madyara
also
admitted that H Mundwa had confessed to using his password on
the day the information relating to the order purportedly
made by
Lesel Cosmetics was erased from the computer. The disciplinary
hearing was adjourned, ostensibly to give management
time to
investigate the allegations by the respondent that someone else could
have used his password unlawfully to delete the order
from the
computer.
When
the hearing resumed, the respondent was told that management
considered it a waste of time to investigate the truthfulness of
his
allegations. He was told that no further hearing would take place
but that a determination would be sent to him.
In the
meantime, Mrs Madyara forwarded all the evidence gathered at the
hearing to the employer. On 25 September 1998
the employer
found the respondent guilty of misconduct and dismissed him from
employment. The letter notifying him of the termination
of the
contract of employment read:
We
refer to hearings held on 25th August
1998 regarding allegations of misconduct levelled against yourself.
You
are advised of managements decision to terminate your employment
contract with Geddes Limited with effect from 10th August
1998. This decision has been taken in accordance with the Code of
Conduct for the Commercial Sector Part IV Offences
paragraphs 5
and 8. Management believes that you were involved in the fraudulent
activities that resulted in substantial prejudice
to the company.
Your computer password was used to delete computer records of
invoices for orders, which later disappeared. Management
has
therefore acted accordingly.
The evidence
on which the employer found that the respondent was guilty of
misconduct has up to now remained a secret, known to management
only.
On
27 October 1998 the respondent lodged an appeal with the Labour
Relations Tribunal. Thirty-three months after he was notified
of
the termination of the contract of employment, he made an application
to the High Court for an order setting aside his suspension,
preferment of the charges, misconduct proceedings, determinations and
dismissal as being null and void. The grounds for his application
were stated in the founding affidavit as being:
- Absence of jurisdiction in
that the proceedings were dealt with by an official who was not the
designated officer and were continued
after fourteen days from their
commencement.
- The charges
were not properly framed in that the factual allegations did not
disclose any misconduct. The suspension was not founded
on
allegations disclosing misconduct. The determination has no basis
in evidence or factual allegations in the charge. The procedure
of
the Code was not followed.
In the
opposing affidavit the appellant took as a point in limine
that in making the application to the High Court thirty-three months
after his dismissal, the respondent was in breach of Order 33
Rule 259 of the High Court Rules 1971, which requires that a
decision should be brought on review within eight weeks of it having
been made. It alleged that as there was no application for
condonation of the late institution of the application for review,
the
application was not properly before the court. On the merits
Mr Chifokoyo, who deposed to the opposing affidavit on behalf
of
the appellant, baldly stated that Mrs Madyara was a designated
officer. He did not produce a letter of her appointment
as such,
even at the eleventh hour. He averred that the letter of suspension
sufficiently informed the respondent of the nature
of the offence he
was accused of having committed.
The
respondent indicated in the answering affidavit that he was applying
for a declaratory order. It was his contention that the
time limit
within which an application for review had to be brought to the High
Court was not applicable to his application. He
persisted in the
allegation that the disciplinary proceedings which led to his
dismissal were a nullity. He said if Mrs Madyara
had been
properly appointed a designated officer in terms of clause 3.3
of the Code, she would have been given her own letter
of appointment.
The employer and the Works Council would each have kept a copy of
the letter of appointment. Up to the time the
application was heard
by the High Court, the appellant had failed to produce the letter
appointing Mrs Madyara as a designated
officer.
The learned
judge correctly decided that the question whether or not the
application was not properly before the court depended
on the nature
of the application. He held that the application was for a
declaration of rights. It was not for a review of the
decision of
Mrs Madyara or that of the appellant finding him guilty of the
alleged misconduct and terminating his contract of
employment. I am
unable to find fault with the learned judges decision.
In deciding
whether an application is for a declaration or review, a court has to
look at the grounds of the application and the
evidence produced in
support of them. The fact that an applicant seeks a declaratory
relief is not in itself proof that the application
is not for review.
In City of Mutare v
Mudzime & Ors 1999
(2) ZLR 140 (S) MUCHECHETERE JA quoted with approval from Kwete
v Africa Publishing Trust & Ors
HH-216-98, where at p 3 of the cyclostyled judgment SMITH J
said:
It
seems to me, with all due respect, that in deciding whether or not,
in an application for damages or reinstatement arising from
alleged
wrongful dismissal from employment, the provisions of Rule 259
of the High Court Rules, 1971 should be complied with,
one should
look at the grounds on which the application is based, rather than
the order sought.
It seems to me anomalous
that one should be
permitted to file an application for review well out of time, without
seeking condonation, as long as a declaratory
order is sought. A
declaratory order is, after all, merely one species of relief
available on review.
In this case
the respondent was not attacking Mrs Madyaras decision to
suspend him from work, the disciplinary proceedings
she presided over
or the decision of the employer to dismiss him from employment. He
was in fact treating these decisions and proceedings
as a nullity.
In other words, they were as good as not having happened and there
was no route leading to them upon which they could
be reviewed. The
ground on which he was treating these decisions and proceedings as a
nullity, was that Mrs Madyara had no
legal authority or
jurisdiction to make the decisions and institute disciplinary
proceedings against him.
In
highlighting the want of jurisdiction on the part of Mrs Madyara
to do what she did, the respondent did not need to review
her
actions. The approach adopted by the respondent receives authority
from the decision in Bayat
& Ors v Hansa & Ano
1955 (3) SA 547 where at 552 C-D CANEY J said:
the
situation, as I see it, is that if the second respondent did decide
the question of contractual rights adversely to the applicants,
it
remained open to them either to review the decision of the second
respondent, notwithstanding that they had taken part in a contest
before the second respondent on the very question, or ignoring
the second respondents decision on that question and treating it
as a nullity as being beyond the powers of the second
respondent, to
bring proceedings for a declaration of rights
. (the underlining is for emphasis)
I accept
that there are terms used by the respondent in the application which
could suggest that the application was for review.
The notice of
the court application stated that it was a review court
application. In para 20 of the founding affidavit,
he said
he did not pursue the appeal before the Labour Relations Tribunal
because he believed that it did not have power to deal
with
irregularities of a reviewable nature". He went on to attack
the failure by Mrs Madyara to properly frame the charge
levelled
against him. The draft order prayed for the setting aside of his
suspension and the disciplinary proceedings.
Setting
aside of a decision or proceeding is a relief normally sought in an
application for review. When one looks at the grounds
on which the
application was based and the evidence produced in support of them,
there is, however, just enough information to support
the learned
judges decision that the application was for a declaration of
rights. In Musara v
Zinatha 1992 (1) ZLR 9
(H) ROBINSON J at 14 C-D said:
At
the outset I would observe that the bulk of the petitioners
petition raises matters, such as malice, gross irrationality,
the
application of the audi
alteram partem
principle and bias, which relate to the subject of review and which
would only render the act in question voidable and not void.
Consequently, those issues are not properly before this court in the
present application which seeks a declaratory order specifically
and
exclusively on the ground that the petitioners purported
suspension is null and void. Fortunately for the petitioner, there
is just sufficient information on the papers to enable the court to
consider the petition as one seeking a declaratory order in regard
to
the petitioners suspension
.
The next
question is whether the learned judge was correct in holding that
this was a case in which a declaratory order ought to
be granted.
The learned judge was entitled on the evidence before him to exercise
the broadest judicial discretion in deciding
whether a declaratory
order should be granted. It cannot be said he did not exercise his
discretion properly. The ground on which
the application was based
was that the appointment of Mrs Madyara by the appellant as a
designated officer was null and void
because the mandatory provisions
of clause 3.3 of the Code had not been complied with.
It was made
very clear to Mr Chifokoyo, who deposed to the opposing
affidavit on behalf of the appellant, that the gravamen
of the
respondents case was that only an appointment of Mrs Madyara
as a designated officer in writing would have invested
in her the
jurisdiction to deal with the allegations of misconduct levelled
against the respondent. The respondent filed an affidavit
from
Gibson Mutukwa, who was a member of the Works Council at the
material time. He averred that the Works Council never sat
to
consider an application by the appellant to appoint Mrs Madyara
as a designated officer.
Mr Chifokoyo
did not deny that Mr Mutukwa was a member of the Works Council
at the relevant time. Even at the eleventh
hour the appellant
failed to produce the letter in terms of which it appointed
Mrs Madyara as a designated officer. It is
clear from the
provisions of the Code that only a person appointed a designated
officer by the employer in
writing could
investigate allegations of misconduct against an employee, suspend
him from work and institute disciplinary proceedings.
In Mugwebe
v Seed Co Ltd & Anor
2000 (1) ZLR 93 (S) the company had the same Code of Conduct as in
casu. The appellant
in that case was suspended by the companys marketing manager, who
was not the companys designated officer.
SANDURA JA
at 96H-97A had this to say about the appellants suspension:
The
question which now arises is whether the appellants suspension was
valid. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that
it was null and
void. It was a complete nullity. In this respect, I can do no
better than quote what LORD DENNING said in
MacFoy
v United Africa Co Ltd
[1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at 1172I:
If
an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad,
but incurably bad. There
is no need for an order of the court to set it aside. It is
automatically null and void without more ado, though it is sometimes
convenient to have the court declare it to be so.
And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and
incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it
to
stay there. It will collapse. (The emphasis is mine)
Having found
that what Mrs Madyara did when she was not a designated officer
was null and void, the learned judge properly
exercised his
discretion in favour of the respondent and granted the declaratory
order.
The appeal
is accordingly dismissed with costs.
EBRAHIM JA:
I agree.
SANDURA JA:
I agree.
Hussein
Ranchod & Co,
appellant's legal practitioners