DISTRIBUTABLE
(113)
Judgment
No. SC 133/02
Civil
Appeal No. 282/99
(1) SARAH
NDLOVU (2) COM-LOC (PRIVATE) LIMITED v
(1)
MOFFAT NDLOVU (2) SIPHOSETHU MAGONYA
SUPREME
COURT OF ZIMBABWE
SANDURA JA,
MALABA JA & GWAUNZA AJA
BULAWAYO,
NOVEMBER 25, 2002 & MARCH 28, 2003
W
Sansole,
for the appellants
P
Dube,
for the respondents
MALABA
JA: On 9 September 1999 the High Court granted judgment
against the appellants in an action in which the respondents
claimed
an order that the appellants jointly and severally pay to them the
sum of $66 632.59, to the first respondent only the
sum of
$1 500, interest on each amount at the prescribed rate from
2 April 1993 and costs of suit.
On
14 October 1999 the appellants purported to file a notice of
appeal against the decision of the High Court sitting at
Bulawayo
in the matter between the parties in case no. HC 3624/95.
After setting out the grounds of appeal the appellants
prayed for the
following relief:
that
the judgment of the court a quo
be dismissed with costs.
When the
appeal was called up for hearing, Ms Dube,
for the respondents, took as a point in
limine
the fact that the notice of appeal was fatally defective, in that it
did not set out the exact nature of the relief sought and omitted
to
state whether the appeal was against the whole or part only of the
judgment.
The notice
of appeal was clearly defective for non-compliance with the mandatory
provisions of rule 29, subrules (c) and (e),
which require the
appellant or his legal representative to state (i) whether the whole
or part only of the judgment is appealed against
and (ii) the exact
nature of the relief which is sought.
In this case
there was no mention of whether the whole or part only of the
judgment was being appealed against. The exact nature
of the relief
sought was not stated. What was prayed for in the notice of appeal
was that the judgment of the court a quo
be dismissed with costs. It is the appeal which is dismissed or
allowed. If the appeal is allowed the judgment or decision appealed
against is then set aside and a new order substituted in its place.
In this case it was not known what order the appellants wanted
this
Court to make in the event the appeal succeeded.
In Jensen
v Acavalos
1993 (1) ZLR 216 (S), KORSAH JA said at 220 B-D:
a
notice of appeal which does not comply with the rules is fatally
defective and invalid. That is to say, it is a nullity. It
is not
only bad but incurably bad, and unless the Court is prepared to grant
an application for condonation of the defect and to
allow a proper
notice of appeal to be filed, the appeal must be struck off the roll
with costs: De Jager
v Diner & Anor
1957 (3) SA 567 (A) at 574 C-D. In Hattingh
v Pienaar
1977 (2) SA 182 (O) at 183, KLOPPER JP held that a fatally
defective compliance with the rules regarding the filing of appeals
cannot be condoned or amended. What should actually be applied for
is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant
rule. With this view I most respectfully agree; for if the notice
of appeal is incurably bad, then, to borrow the words of LORD DENNING
in McFoy
v United Africa Co Ltd
[1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at 1172I, every proceeding which is
founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put
something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will
collapse.
As
the notice of appeal which purported to institute this appeal was
incurably defective, there was no appeal before the Court.
The
matter is struck off the roll with costs.
SANDURA JA:
I agree.
GWAUNZA
AJA: I agree.
Sansole &
Senda,
appellants' legal practitioners
Coghlan
& Welsh,
respondents' legal practitioners