DISTRIBUTABLE
(101)
Judgment No. SC. 129/04
Civil
Application No. 194/04
GEDDES
LIMITED v SHEPHERD BWANYA
SUPREME
COURT OF ZIMBABWE
HARARE,
SEPTEMBER 15 & 29, OCTOBER 13, 2004 & JANUARY 26, 2005
G Gabu,
for the applicant
J B
Colegrave SC, for the respondent
Before: MALABA JA, In Chambers, in terms of Rule 31 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe
This
application is for an extension of time in which to appeal against a
judgment of the High Court handed down on 28 April
2004 and for
condonation of non-compliance with Rule 30 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (the Rules).
The
historical events relevant to the determination of the application
are these. The respondent, who was employed by the applicant
as a
financial director, was on 11 January 2002 suspended pending
investigations by external auditors into allegations of misconduct.
Although the letter of suspension had not informed the respondent
that the suspension was on full pay and other benefits, the applicant
made that clear in the subsequent letter written to him on 15 January
2002. Consequently, the respondent had the right to
retain
possession of the Mazda B 2500 5DX motor vehicle during the
period of suspension.
In the
letter of 15 January 2002, the applicant advised the respondent
of what it intended doing after his suspension. It
stated:
We will contact you when the investigation is complete, which we
hope will be by 31 January 2002. Your case will be referred
to
the Audit Committee of the Board, who will decide whether or not to
take action on the matter and whether or not to proceed with
your
dismissal. If it is found that you are guilty of the misconduct
which has been alleged, we will then apply to the Ministry
of Labour
to terminate your contract of employment on the grounds of misconduct
in accordance with the termination of employment
regulations SI 371
of 1985.
It is
likely that we will be applying for the termination of your
employment on the basis of Section 2(d)(i) any act, conduct
or omission inconsistent with the express or implied conditions of
his contract of employment.
Please
note that if you are found guilty of misconduct, and if we decide to
apply to the Ministry for authority to dismiss you, then
the
suspension from that time will be without pay and benefits.
(the underlining is mine)
The investigation by the external auditors was completed and the
report on its findings submitted to the audit committee of the
board.
The conclusion drawn by the audit committee from the consideration
of the report is not apparent from the papers. In particular,
it is
not stated that the audit committee found the respondent
guilty of misconduct. Presumably following a decision
to do
so, an application was, however, made to a labour relations officer
on 8 April 2002 in terms of s 3(1)(a) of the
Labour
Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of
Employment) Regulations 1985 (the Regulations) for an order
or
determination terminating the respondents employment.
Section 3(1)
of the Regulations provided that:
Where an employer has good cause to believe that an employee is
guilty of misconduct the employer may suspend such employee without
pay and other benefits and shall forthwith apply to a labour
relations officer for an order or determination terminating the
contract
of employment.
The
ground on which the application was made was that the respondent had
committed an act, conduct or omission inconsistent with
the
fulfilment of the express or implied conditions of his contract.
The particulars of the misconduct were then set out.
On
11 April 2002 the applicant wrote to the respondent, advising
him of the fact that payment of his salary had been withheld
and
demanding the return of the motor vehicle. The applicant justified
its demand by saying that in terms of its letter of 15 January
2002 the making of the application for authority to dismiss the
respondent from employment had changed the suspension he was serving
into one without pay and benefits. The argument was that the
respondents right to payment of a salary and possession of the
motor vehicle had ceased.
The
respondent refused to surrender the motor vehicle, arguing that the
applicant had not suspended him without pay and benefits
in terms of
the Regulations. An application was made to the High Court for an
order directing the respondent to deliver the motor
vehicle to the
applicant, failing which the Deputy Sheriff or his lawful assistant
be authorised to attach, take possession of and
deliver the same to
the applicant. The respondent opposed the application. The
question for determination by the High Court was
whether he had been
suspended without pay and other benefits in terms of s 3(1)(a)
of the Regulations.
On
28 April 2004 the High Court held that the respondent had not
been suspended without pay and other benefits and dismissed
the
application with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.
The learned judge said:
It is difficult to understand how the applicant ceased the
respondents salary and benefits
when his suspension was on
full
pay and benefits. What it ought to have done was to formally
suspend the respondent with or without pay and benefits and then,
forthwith, ought to have applied to a labour relations officer for
permission to terminate the contract of employment. It was not
proper for the applicant to withdraw the respondents benefits when
his suspension was with full pay and benefits without issuing
a fresh
suspension without salary and benefits.
If the
applicant was desirous of appealing against the judgment of the High
Court, it was bound by Rule 34 of the Rules to
institute the
appeal within fifteen days of the judgment being given. That was
not done. On 14 June 2004 an application
was made for an
extension of time in which to note the appeal and for condonation of
non-compliance with the Rules. There was a
delay of forty-five days
from the date the judgment was given to the day the application for
an extension of time was made. There
was a delay of seventeen days
from the expiry of the period in which the appeal should have been
noted to the date the application
for condonation was made.
The
explanation given by the applicant for the delay was that it laboured
under the misconception that the days within which to
note an appeal
were reckoned from when it received a copy of the judgment from its
legal practitioners on 12 May 2004. As
to why the appeal was
still not instituted within fifteen days of the date it received the
judgment, the applicant said its officers
were still deliberating on
the need to appeal against the judgment.
The
applicant averred that the appeal had good prospects of success
should the application be granted. The contention was that
in
holding that the respondent was suspended on full pay and benefits at
the time the demand for the return of the motor vehicle
in his
possession was made, the court a quo failed to
appreciate the import of the letters written to the respondent by the
applicant. The averment was that as the application
for
authority to dismiss the respondent from employment was made on
8 April 2002, the court a quo should have found in
terms of the letter of 15 January 2002 that with effect from
that date then the respondents suspension
ceased to be on full pay
and benefits.
In
opposing the application, the respondent said the applicant knew
through its legal practitioner that the judgment had been given
on
28 April 2004. It did not act on the judgment until 14 June
2004. Implicit in the explanation that the delay was
due partly to
a misconception that the time in which to appeal was reckoned from
the day it received a copy of the judgment was the
admission that it
was told that an appeal had to be noted within fifteen days of the
judgment. In other words, the applicants
officers misconceived
what the legal practitioner had told them.
The
respondent said the appeal had no good prospects of success. He
said as the applicant had suspended him on full pay and other
benefits it should have re-suspended him without pay and benefits in
terms of s 3(1) of the Regulations before making the application
to the labour relations officer for an order or determination
terminating his contract of employment if it believed on good cause
that he was guilty of misconduct. As that had not been done, his
right to the payment of salary and possession of the motor vehicle
did not cease at the time the application for an order or
determination terminating his contract was made.
The
factors to be taken into account in the determination of an
application for extension of time in which to appeal and for
condonation
of non-compliance with the Rules are
(a) the extent of the delay;
(b) the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay;
(c) whether the litigant himself is responsible for the delay;
(d) the prospects of success on appeal should the application be
granted; and
(e) the possible prejudice to the respondent should the application
be granted.
See De Kuszaba-Dabrowski v Steel N.O. 1966 RLR 60 (A); Kombayi
v Berkhout 1988 (1) ZLR 53 (S).
Although
it cannot be said a delay of seventeen days in making an application
for condonation is an inordinate delay, the same cannot
be said
regarding the delay in instituting the appeal. No reason was given
for the alleged misconception by the applicants officers
of the
obligation to reckon the date in which to note an appeal from the day
the judgment was given. There was no basis on which
it could be
said the explanation given was reasonable.
The fact
that the applicants officers did not try to note the appeal within
fifteen days of the date of receipt of the copy of
the judgment
suggests that the alleged misconception of the date from which the
time in which to appeal was to be reckoned had no
bearing on its
failure to comply with the Rules. It is clear from the facts that
the applicants officers were responsible for
the delay, in that
they took their time deliberating over the need to appeal against the
judgment of the court a quo, oblivious of the fact that
the time in which to note the appeal had to be observed.
The
appeal has no good prospects of success. Section 3(1)(a) of
the Regulations gave the applicant as an employer a power
to suspend
the respondent without pay and other benefits if it believed on good
cause that he was guilty of misconduct. In exercising
the power the
applicant had at some point in time to tell the respondent that he
was being suspended without pay and other benefits
with effect from a
specific date pending an order or determination by a labour relations
officer terminating his contract of employment
for misconduct.
The
question for determination by the court a quo was whether
or not the respondent was suspended without pay and other benefits
before the application was made to the labour relations
officer for
an order terminating his contract of employment. Was there evidence
of the applicant telling the respondent that until
he was dismissed
by order or determination from the labour relations officer he was
not to do anything in the discharge of the duties
of his office and
that he was not going to be paid his salary and other benefits during
the period of suspension?
My view
of the facts is that there was no evidence of the respondent having
been suspended without pay and other benefits in terms
of s 3(1)
of the Regulations. Ordinarily, such evidence would be found in the
form of a letter of suspension. A suspension
does not, of course,
have to be in writing. No letter was produced by the applicant in
terms of which it suspended the respondent
without pay and other
benefits before the application to the labour relations officer for
an order or determination terminating his
contract of employment was
made. There had to be such a letter or evidence of an oral
direction to the respondent if a valid suspension
without pay was to
be proved, because s 3(1) of the Regulations required that an
application for authority to dismiss an employee
believed on good
cause to be guilty of misconduct had to be made to the labour
relations officer forthwith from the date of his suspension.
The
letter of 15 January 2002 is, in my view, not a letter of
suspension for the purposes of the requirements of s 3(1)
of the
Regulations. Not only was the date of the suspension mentioned
therein too far ahead of the date when the application was
made, the
suspension itself had been imposed pending the investigation
conducted by the external auditors. When the investigation
was
completed the suspension became inoperative.
In any
case, the letter does not tell the respondent that he was being, or
had been, suspended without pay and other benefits, but
suggested
that he had to presume that he was suspended without pay and other
benefits from the occurrence of certain events in the
future. It
would not be in compliance with the requirements of s 3(1) of
the Regulations to leave the worker to deduce the
fact of being
suspended without pay and other benefits from the future behaviour of
his employer.
The
letter was vague on when the suspension without pay and other
benefits would have effect in the future. For example, it was
suggested that a decision to apply to the labour relations officer
for authority to dismiss the respondent would automatically bring
about a suspension without pay and other benefits. In the founding
affidavit it was stated, in para 8.4, that:
The application letter to the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare was written and delivered on the 8th of April
2002. With effect from that date then, the respondents
suspension ceased to be on full pay and benefits.
If it
was intended that the suspension without pay and other benefits would
be dependent upon the making of the application for
authority to
dismiss the respondent, it would not have been the suspension
contemplated in s 3(1) of the Regulations. That
suspension
would have had to precede the making of the application to the labour
relations officer for an order or determination
terminating the
respondents contract of employment.
The
application is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Scanlen
& Holderness, applicant's legal practitioners
Ahmed &
Ziyambi, respondent's legal practitioners