REPORTABLE (39)
Judgment No
SC 46/05
Civil Appeal No 38/04
TWIN
WIRE AGENCIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED v CENTRAL
AFRICA BUILDING SOCIETY
SUPREME COURT OF
ZIMBABWE
CHIDYAUSIKU CJ,
SANDURA JA & ZIYAMBI JA
HARARE JULY 19, 2005
The appellant in
person, through J.M. Mabureki
T. Biti, for the
respondent
CHIDYAUSIKU CJ: At the conclusion of submissions by the
parties in this matter the appeal was dismissed with costs. Reasons
for judgment were to follow. The following are the reasons for
judgment.
The facts of this case are common cause and are aptly summarised by
the judge in the court a quo. The respondent is the
registered owner of Stand 2796 KweKwe of Stand 2999 KweKwe Township
situate in the district of KweKwe (hereinafter
referred to as the
property). The property is held by the respondent under Deed of
Transfer Number 4525/01 dated 27 November 2001.
The respondent
purchased this property on 27 April 2001 following a Sheriffs sale
in execution in a matter where the respondent
was the plaintiff and
the appellant was the defendant. The respondent had foreclosed on a
mortgage bond registered by the appellant
on the security of Stand
2796 for a failure by the appellant to maintain its mortgage
repayment in terms of the bond.
The appellant refused
to vacate the property notwithstanding its purchase and subsequent
transfer to the respondent. The respondent
launched a court action
for the eviction of the appellant. The appellant entered an
appearance to defend. The respondent applied
for summary judgment.
The appellant opposed the application for summary judgment for
eviction on three grounds.
The first ground that
the appellant gave was that the sale was not properly made and done
above board. The second was that the purchase
price fetched at the
auction was unreasonably low. The third was that the appellant had
the capacity to pay off what was due to
the respondent and retain its
property and, therefore, should have been given the opportunity to
sell the property by way of private
treaty.
The court a quo
granted the summary judgment for the eviction of the appellant from
the property. In doing so the court concluded that the appellant
had raised no defence to the claim for eviction and that there were
no triable issues that would necessitate the matter proceeding
to
trial.
The appellant was
dissatisfied with this judgment and now appeals to this Court.
A perusal of the
appellants heads of argument reveals that the basis of its appeal
to this Court is captured in paragraph III(b)
of its heads of
argument which reads:-
The appellant submitted to the Court a quo that it must not
grant the relief of ejectment summarily because the appellant had
instituted proceedings against the Sheriff challenging
the sale under
Case Number HC 3750/01 referred to by his hardships (sic) of the
Court a quos judgment. The Court must have considered
this and other defences and referred the matter to a full blown
trial. Further, the
Court erred in finding for the respondent that
the proceedings in Case Number HC 3750/01 were withdrawn. Appellant
had not withdrawn
the claims and if there was any withdrawal such
withdrawal was made without his consent.
In my view the conclusion of the learned judge in the court a
quo that case number HC3750/01 was withdrawn cannot be faulted.
The record clearly shows that the case was withdrawn. No evidence
was placed before the court to show that the withdrawal was not in
accordance with the rules or that the matter had been reinstated.
Accordingly the court
a quo, in my view, was correct in proceeding on the basis that
the proceedings which the appellant alleged were pending, and because
they
were pending, afforded him a defence, were in fact not pending.
But even if those proceedings were pending they would not afford
the
appellant any defence to a claim for eviction. In Case Number HC
3750/01 the appellant was seeking to prevent eviction on the
basis
that it was challenging the sale in execution. A challenge to a
sale in execution does not constitute a defence against a
claim for
eviction by the registered owner of the property.
In Mapedzamombe v
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe & Anor 1996 (1) ZLR 257 at pp
260D-261A GUBBAY CJ had this to say:-
Before a sale is confirmed in terms of r 360, it is a conditional
sale and any interested party may apply to court for it to be
set
aside. At that stage, even though the court has a discretion to set
aside the sale in certain circumstances, it will not readily
do so.
See Lalla v Bhura, supra at 283A-B. Once confirmed by the
sheriff in compliance with r 360, the sale of the property is no
longer conditional. That being
so, a court would be even more
reluctant to set aside the sale pursuant to an application in terms
of r 359 for it to do so. See
Naran v Midlands Chemical
Industries (Pvt) Ltd S-220-91 (not reported) at pp 6-7. When
the sale of the property not only has been properly confirmed by the
sheriff but transfer
effected by him to the purchaser against payment
of the price, any application to set aside the transfer falls outside
r 359 and
must conform strictly with the principles of the common
law.
This is the
insurmountable difficulty which now besets the appellant. The
features urged on his behalf, such as the unreasonably
low price
obtained at the public auction and his prospects of being able to
settle the judgment debt without there being the necessity
to deprive
him of his home, even if they could be accepted as cogent, are of no
relevance. This is because under the common law
immovable property
sold by judicial decree after transfer has been passed cannot be
impeached in the absence of an allegation of
bad faith, or knowledge
of the prior irregularities in the sale of execution, or fraud. See
Sookdeyi & Ors v Sahadeo & Ors 1952 (4) SA 568 (A) at
571H-572A; Gibson NO v Iscor Housing Utility Co Ltd & Ors
1963 (3) SA 783 (T) at 787A-B; Maponga v Jabangwe 1983 (2)
ZLR 395 (S) at 396D-E; van den Berg v Transkei Development
Corporation 1991 (4) SA 78 (TkG) at 80G-J; Erasmus v Michael
James (Pty) Ltd 1994 (2) SA 528 (C) at 552F.
This principle of the
common law has been codified in s 70 of the South African Magistrates
Court Act of 1944, but not in the comparable
Zimbabwean Act or
Rules.
It is quite clear
from the remarks of the learned CHIEF JUSTICE that the remedy to set
aside a sale in execution in terms of rule
359 of the High Court
Rules is only open to a litigant in circumstances where transfer has
not taken place. After transfer any
application to set aside such
transfer should conform strictly with the principles of the common
law and falls outside the ambit
of Rule 359 of the High Court Rules.
Thus even if the proceedings in HC 3750/01 were still pending such
proceedings would not amount to an adequate challenge of the
respondents
ownership of the property in question and his
entitlement to possession or occupation of the property. The
appellant in the above
case sought to set aside the confirmation of
the sale in execution by the Sheriff and was not seeking transfer of
the property from
the respondent to itself. The other proffered
defence that the appellant can now pay the purchase price is no
defence at all.
The question of ability to pay is irrelevant.
I am satisfied that on the papers the appellant did not allege any
facts that would constitute a defence if the matter had gone to
trial.
Accordingly the court a quo was correct in granting the
summary judgment.
It was for these reasons that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
SANDURA JA: I agree.
ZIYAMBI JA: I
agree.
Masawi Mangwana &
Partners, appellant's legal practitioners
Wilmot & Bennet,
respondent's legal practitioners