Judgment No
SC 10/08
Civil
Appeal No 248/07
FIONA
CHIKURUNHE AND TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOUR
OTHERS v ZIMBABWE FINANCIAL HOLDINGS
SUPREME COURT ZIMBABWE
HARARE, MARCH 12 &
MAY 20, 2008
T Biti, for the
applicants
R Y Phillips,
for the respondent
Before:
GARWE JA: In Chambers in terms of s 92(F) of the Labour Act, [Cap
8:01].
This
is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in terms
of s 92 (F) (3) of the Labour Act, [Chapter 28:01].
This matter was heard before the Labour Court, Harare. The facts
which the court found were common cause were that the two parties
to
this matter were at the relevant time engaged in discussions
regarding the conditions of service of the applicants in general
and
a cost of living adjustment in particular. On 24 September 2004 the
applicants withdrew their labour from 8.00 hours, to 10.00
hours i.e
a period of two hours. The withdrawal of labour was countrywide and
had the effect of disrupting the respondents
operations.
At issue before the Labour Court was whether on the basis of the
above facts the applicants had engaged in a collective job action
as
defined in s 2 of the Labour Act, Cap 28:01. The court found that
the applicants had withdrawn their labour in a concerted
action aimed
at causing the respondent to take some action. In the event the
Labour Court dismissed the appeal before it with
costs.
Not satisfied with the above decision, the applicants applied to
the Court for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. That application
was turned down on 18 September 2007. On 7 November 2007 the
applicants then filed the present application seeking leave to appeal
against the decision of the Labour Court.
In their founding papers, the applicants submit that the decision
of the Labour Court was on a point of law. They further submit
that
the court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that what happened
constituted a collective job action.
The respondent opposed the application on three grounds. These
were firstly that the deponent to the applicants founding
affidavit had no authority to represent the remaining applicants;
secondly that the leave that the applicants seek is on a question
of
fact and not law; and thirdly that the court a quo was correct
in coming to the conclusion that the conduct of the applicants on the
day in question constituted an unlawful collective
job action.
At the hearing of the matter before me Mr Phillips made no
submissions on the suggestion that the deponent had no authority to
file the present application on behalf of the other
applicants. I
therefore assumed that this submission was no longer being persisted
in. He, however, made the point in limine that the
application had been filed out of time and was therefore not properly
before the Court. He also submitted that on the
merits the
application is hopeless and should be dismissed.
Section 92 F(3) of the Labour Act provides that if the President of
the Labour Court refuses to grant leave, the party seeking
such leave
may seek leave to appeal from a Judge of the Supreme Court. No time
limit has been provided for within which such an
application may be
made to a Supreme Court Judge. Mr Phillips suggested that
pursuant to the provisions of r 58 of the Supreme Court Rules, Rules
262 and 263 of the High Court Rules apply in
the instant case. That
submission is not correct. Rules 262 and 263 relate specifically to
criminal proceedings and in particular
to a situation where after
sentence the accused immediately makes an oral application for leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court
or where he fails to do so he files a
written application within twelve days of such decision for such
leave. Whilst accepting
that Rule 58 of the Supreme Court Rules
provides that in any matter not provided for in the Rules the
practice and procedure of
the Supreme Court shall as far as is
possible follow the practice and procedure of the High Court, I am of
the view that Rules
262 and 263 refer to a different situation
altogether and that therefore they do not apply in the present
situation.
As already observed, neither the Labour Court Rules nor the Supreme
Court Rules have made provision for the time limit that is
to apply
in this situation. There is therefore a gap in the law in this
regard. The point in limine raised by Mr Phillips in
this regard must therefore fail.
The respondent has argued that this application should be dismissed
because the decision in respect of which leave to appeal
is sought
was on the facts and not law. I do not agree with this submission.
The facts of this case were common cause and have
already been
outlined in this judgment. Whether those facts constitute a
collective job action as defined in the Act would appear
to me to be
a question not of fact (as the facts are common cause) but rather of
law.
On the merits however it seems to me that the applicants have no
prospects of success on appeal. The facts which the court
found
were common cause warranted the conclusion that indeed a collective
job action was carried out. The applicants conduct
must be viewed
in the context of discussions that were taking place on the
applicants conditions of service and in particular
the need for a
cost of living adjustment. The suggestion by Mr Biti that it
is not clear what demand was made is therefore not tenable. In my
view, the conclusion reached by the learned President
is
unimpeachable.
One further matter calls for comment and that is the suggestion by
Mr Biti that an application of this matter should be routinely
granted by this Court since the restriction on the right of appeal
imposed
by s 92 is a derogation from a partys constitutional right
to appeal. I do not agree with this submission. Complying with the
provision of s 92 F(3) should not be regarded as mere formality. The
party seeking leave must show inter alia that he has prospects
of success on appeal. In other words, leave is not granted simply
because a party has sought such leave.
The applicants have no prospects of success on appeal.
The application is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Honey & Blackenberg, applicants legal practitioners
Gill, Godlonton & Gerrans, respondents legal
practitioners