The applicants were former employees on a farm that had been expropriated for resettlement and had been allocated to other beneficiaries. They did not vacate the farm when it was expropriated and continued to live and work on it.
The respondent had ordered that they vacate the farm as they were occupying the land unlawfully. They refused to do as they held that as part of their conditions of employment with the previous owner, he gave them accommodation, food and facilities. They maintained that the acquisition of the farm had not meant the automatic termination of their contract of employment, rather that it had resulted in a transfer of the farming undertaking and consequently, the beneficiaries had assumed the position of employer, with the concomitant responsibility of maintaining terms and conditions similar to those they previously enjoyed.

The court first had to decide whether a constitutional issue arose before the Court, if not then there would be no need to hear the matter any further.  Secondly, whether the applicants were guilty of a criminal offence and if so, whether the applicants would remain employees of the new farm owners.
The court held that Section 3 of the Gazetted Lands Act had been scrutinized by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions and was found to be constitutional. Therefore, the court re-affirmed  the provision that criminalized their unlawful occupation and held that there was no constitutional issue to be referred.

The matter was dismissed.

This was an application for an interim relief of setting aside the first respondent’s directive that ordered the applicant to cease their diamond mining operations after the applicant’s rights in a ceded portion of a special grant 4765 expired.

The applicant argued that clause 8 of the grant allowed it to work the sites which were ceded to it for an indefinite period of time. The first respondent countered this on the basis of s 291 of the Mines and Minerals Act that requires special grants to be issued for a specified period of time.

Further, the first respondent argued that no real cession had occurred since the applicant as the holder of the ceded and ‘residual’ portions of the grant were operating outside the law.

The court noted that the first respondent gave the applicants a 5-year period to renew the grant when they allowed the grant to operate outside the law before declaring it invalid, and the applicants still failed to renew it. For this reason, the applicant was found to have approached the court with ‘dirty hands’ since it was in breach of the condition of the special grant and s 29 of the act.

The applicant failed to prove that the first respondent acted unlawfully, unreasonably or disproportionately for the court to apply its review discretion. The court, therefore, held that the first respondent was right in exercising its administrative discretion and pronouncing what the law said.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.

This was an application for an order of remedy of spoliation and an interdict.

The applicantĺs main argument was that the actions of the respondentsĺ occupation of the diamond mining site at the Chiadzwa Concession amounted to an act of spoliation against the fifth respondent.

Firstly, the court determined whether the applicant (a foreign company) was required to furnish security for the costs of the respondents before the application could proceed. The court noted that such orders are matters of its discretion and are only issued when there is a reason to believe that a company will be unable to pay the costs of the suit.

Secondly, the court found that the second to fourth respondents had come to court with Ĺdirty handsĺ but had cleansed themselves.

Thirdly, it was held that the applicant (a shareholder of the fifth respondent) had the locus standi to bring the derivative action as an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189.

Finally, the court found that the applicant had proved the elements of spoliation: peaceful and undisturbed possession and the act of spoliation on a balance of probabilities. However, the court held that allowing the fifth respondent to resume mining operations as before, when the right to do so expired, would be contrary to public policy. Nevertheless, the court noted that the applicant was entitled to a final order and ordered the restoration of its rights when the validity of the special grants was regularized.

The applicant sought an order compelling the respondents to supply water to its premises which they had failed to supply for about three years.  The applicant contended that the respondents were not doing enough to ensure adequate supply of water to residents. 

The respondents averred that the situation was out of their hands as they faced various obstacles for effective service delivery and further that when s 183 of the Urban Councils Act (the empowering provision) was enacted, the legislature was mindful of the fact that the respondents may not be able to provide water to residents because of the use of the word “may’’ in the section and that their failure to provide water was justifiable.

The court had to decide on the interpretation of the empowering provision and whether the reasons for failure were justifiable. The court held that the word “may” in s 183 was recognised that there were instances when a council may fail to provide and supply adequate water. The legislature was alive to the possibility that the institution delegated to supply the water, may at some stage, have been unable to comply with the requirement.

However, if such failure was justifiable, the court held that the explanation given for the respondent’s failure to supply water was simply lack of resources. It did not appear that any effort was being made to ensure that the applicant got adequate supplies of water and as such fell short of the justifiable threshold. The application was successful.