The origin of the application is an interim interdict prohibiting the first, second and third respondents from carrying out mining activities and ordering the fourth and fifth respondents to clear illegals who were working at the mine. The first respondent sought a review of this order and got an interim interdict that ordered for the eviction of the applicant and prohibition from mining.

This application arose when the applicant sought direction from the judges in chambers for anticipation of a return date and also rescinding the eviction order.

The court applied Order 33 of the High Court Rules and held that the pending review suspended the operation of the order issued in the magistrate court. Consequently, the applicant could not exercise the rights conferred upon him unless the review was determined in his favor.
The court found that the mine lies in the applicant’s plot. However, the court found it important for peace to prevail at the mine and that both parties be removed from the mine pending resolution of their dispute.

The court held that the applicant was able to prove all the requirements of an interdict: he had a right to mine; he would suffer irreparable damage if the respondent continued with their mining operations; he had no alternative remedy and he proved his case on a balance of probabilities against the respondent.

Accordingly, the interdict was granted pending the resolution of the dispute and the security guards of both parties were ordered to guard the mine jointly. 

This was an application for a spoliation order to summarily undo the wrongful deprivation of property without investigating the merits.

The applicants claimed that their immovable property (10 Metcalf Road, Greendale) and equipment for water abstraction were seized by the first to sixth respondents.

The first to the sixth respondents raised two preliminary objections: that the matter was not urgent and that there was need for police to join as co-respondents since they were the ones who had seized the applicants’ property. The first objection was abandoned while the second was dealt with in the merits of the case.

The court noted that the applicants were required to prove peaceful and undisturbed control before the disturbance and that the respondent took or destroyed the control unlawfully. However, the applicant would not succeed if the respondent proved valid defenses like they did not commit the spoliation or that they were not involved in the spoliation.

The court found that the applicants were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property and equipment although, illegally. However, the court noted that the applicants claimed that they were despoiled of their equipment by the first to sixth respondents who were not natural persons but failed to state who acted on their behalf. The court therefore held that the respondents were not involved in the despoiling.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.

This was an application to interdict the respondent from disconnecting water supplies from the applicant’s property without a court order and from charging commercial rates for the use of water from the said property.

The applicant submitted that the respondent was infringing on their right to water as provided in s 77(a) of the constitution. In interpreting the right to water, the court found that the right empowers local authorities to levy rates to raise revenue for service provision and does not prohibit disconnections of water services for non-payment. Additionally, the court held that the right to water contains the protection against arbitrary and illegal disconnections. Consequently, when a bill is genuinely disputed there should be recourse to the court before disconnection as per s 69 (3) of the constitution and the holding in Mushoriwa v City of Harare HH 195/14.

The court held that the applicant had proved his right to water but failed to prove the genuineness of his claim, since he did not provide proof letters of complaint disputing the bills. This also had a negative bearing on the grant of the interdict order.

The court also found that the applicant converted domestic premises for use as commercial premises and was not entitled to be charged domestic rates. 

The court also noted that the applicant failed to give adequate information which would show that the respondent did not follow the correct procedure in zoning and rating it.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.

The court considered a criminal appeal against the sentence imposed on the accused. 

The accused was convicted, on his own guilty plea, for contravening s 3(1)(a) of the Gold Trade Act by being in possession of 0.15 grams of gold without authorisation.

The evidence revealed that the accused was asked whether there were any special circumstances, which the court below established did not exist and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence.

The accused argued that the trial judge did not explain in full what special circumstances meant and the inadequate explanation prejudiced him. The respondent agreed and stated that the explanation was “special or extraordinary mitigating factors” where it should have referred to special circumstances. 

The court found that the Act did not define special circumstances, and it was on a case by case basis. However, the court below took all necessary steps to explain the meaning and import of special circumstances, which was given in clear unambiguous terms. 

The court found that the accused was not an illiterate person and appreciated what was taking place and there was nothing preventing him from asking the magistrate for clarity. Further, that the accused’s conduct once arrested, in running away illustrated a guilty state of mind. 

The court found that the accused’s special circumstance of “being the only breadwinner” was clear that he was aware of the offence being committed. As such, the court found no merit in the appeal.